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Caveat Vendor:
A Call to Reform the Scope of Rights of
Withdrawal for Off-Premises Contracts
Under U.S. Consumer Protection Laws
with Respect to the Auction of Art
Sarah Fabian Maramarosy*
As sales of art at auction become increasingly popular and
accessible, an overlooked consumer right may cause sellers of art
to get “burned.” At its core, the auction process is intended to
establish the price of a difficult-to-value object of art, therefore,
the underlying philosophy of an auction is that sales are final.
However, cooling-off rules in U.S. off-premises contracts are broad
enough that auction house contracts can potentially fall within the
ambit of these rules, giving rise to the consumer’s right to cancel
the contract.
Arguably, permitting consumers to cancel in remorse
undermines the premise of an auction and may be detrimental to the
market value of the artwork, the auctioneer’s business, and by
extension the consumer. Cooling-off rules are ineffective in the
context of art auctions because these rules were not drafted with an
understanding of the mechanics of the auction process or the
characteristics of the art market, including the subjective value of
art. In fact, applying these rules to art transactions would be
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consumer protection overreach. These rules were designed to
redress high pressure sales techniques used by door-to-door
salesmen who cornered vulnerable consumers at home. By contrast,
the relationship between an auction house and a consignor or
winning bidder is very different: the balance of bargaining power
favors the consumer. Further, for the auction process to be effective,
the consumer cannot be permitted to walk away from the sale
out of remorse.
Despite some ambiguity in the U.S. legal framework, it is
important to not assume that these cooling-off rules do not apply to
auction house contracts. Such a mistake could extend the prescribed
cooling-off period indefinitely, thus aggravating the costs of
administering returns. Ultimately, the art world will be handicapped
by the uncertainty of the application of these rules, therefore, the
time for reform is now. It is upon stakeholders in the artworld, who
have industry expertise that regulators and legislators are unlikely
to have, to proactively petition the Federal Trade Commission to
develop new approaches to the right to withdraw as it relates to
art transactions.
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INTRODUCTION
If you were to buy a work of art at an auction in New York, you
probably would not be able to return it; but in London, you could
return it during a “cooling-off” period. A cooling-off period, or
withdrawal right, is a state-mandated contract term that provides
consumers the power to cancel a contract without cause during a set
timeframe.1 While this consumer right provides buyers leeway to
reconsider the bargain, sellers of art may get “burned.”2
Under European law, consumers have a generic right to
withdraw from contracts formed outside of the seller’s business
premises. 3 Recent changes to the European Commission’s
Consumer Rights Directive (“CRD”) explicitly include auctions
within the scope of this regulation.4 These changes have prompted
auction houses in Europe to amend their contracts to include notice
of the right to withdraw,5 and have led to apprehension about the

1

Patricia Sánchez Abril, et al., The Right of Withdrawal in Consumer Contracts: A
Comparative Analysis of American and European Law, INDRET, March 2018, at 31; see
also Pamaria Rekaiti & Roger Van den Bergh, Cooling-Off Periods in the Consumer Laws
of the EC Member States: A Comparative Law and Economics Approach, 23 J. CONSUMER
POL’Y 371, 371, 373 (2000) (stating that a cooling-off period is also “referred to as a right
to cancellation, as a right to rescind, disaffirm, or revoke a contract, or more generally as a
withdrawal right.”).
2
A work of art is “burned” when it fails to sell at auction. See Is an Artwork “BURNT”
by Failing to Sell at a Public Auction?, ARTEMUNDI GLOBAL FUND (Jan. 13, 2014),
http://artemundiglobalfund.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Myth-Busters-BIAnalysis.pdf [https://perma.cc/DX4U-E2FF] [hereinafter BI Report].
3
See Council Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of
25 October 2011 on Consumer Rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and
Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Repealing
Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council, 2011 O.J. (L 304) 64 (EC).
4
See generally Kinfemicheal Yilma Desta, The Scope of Rights of Withdrawal in
Consumer Contracts Under EU Law: The Case of Auctions, UIO (2012),
https://www.duo.uio.no/handle/10852/34428 [https://perma.cc/FHN6-HF8].
5
Compare Conditions of Online-Only Sale, PHILLIPS (Oct. 19, 2018),
https://www.phillips.com/buysell/online-only/conditions [https://perma.cc/4KV7-835P]
(including a notice provision for the European right of withdrawal at paragraph 11), with
Conditions of Sale, PHILLIPS (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.phillips.com/buysell/
newyork/conditions [https://perma.cc/MC6B-DRW6] (lacking notice of the U.S. right of
withdrawal). These disclosure amendments are significant because in instances where the
right to withdraw applies and the seller fails to inform the consumer of this right, the
cancellation (“cooling-off”) period may be automatically extended until actual notice is
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fate of the European art market.6 Pierre Valentin, Sotheby’s former
in-house counsel, has warned that this new consumer protection law
may undermine the auctioning of art because “[t]he right to cancel
is fundamentally incompatible with the sale at auction of art,
antiques and collectible items.”7
Withdrawal rights are incompatible with art auctions because
returning a work of art poses potentially devastating consequences
to a one-of-a-kind item’s value. 8 The price of art is volatile and
reputationally sensitive to such a degree that the art community
considers art that fails to sell “burnt,” which significantly decreases
its value.9 Burning could make it difficult to sell the piece of art for
many years to come.10 It could even negatively impact the price of
the artist’s other works as well as those within the same art
movement.11 Thus, if either a consignor or winning bidder were to
withdraw after a widely publicized auction, the auction house (and
by extension the consumer) would be stuck with the tremendous cost

provided. See infra Appendix A. Therefore, the cooling-off period could extend
indefinitely, and permit buyers to return years later to rescind the sale. See infra Part I.B.2.
6
See Anny Shaw, New Rules Threaten Online Art Market in the UK, ART NEWSPAPER,
(Jan. 9, 2014), https://www.artatlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/New-rulesthreaten-online-art-market-in-the-UK-The-Art-Newspaper-Jan-2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3YSH-AULE]; Georgina Adam, Los Angeles Art Market Hots Up, FIN.
TIMES (Sept. 12, 2014), https://www.artatlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/LosAngeles-art-market-hots-up-FT-Sept-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/5C3X-Q54D]; New
Consumer Remedies: Be Prepared, ANTIQUES TRADE GAZETTE (Oct. 10, 2015),
https://www.artatlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/New-consumer-remedies-beprepared-Antiques-Trade-Gazette-October-2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/99JS-YAFT];
Ashitha Nagesh, UK Law Change to Jeopardize Online Art Market, BLOUIN ARTINFO (Apr.
12, 2016), https://constantinecannon.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/UK-Law-Changeto-Jeopardise-Online-Art-Market-BLOUIN-ARTINFO-Jan-2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UL5H-3LFD].
7
Pierre Valentin, Danger Ahead – Auctions Undermined by New Consumer Protection,
ART AT L. (Nov. 23, 2013), https://www.artatlaw.com/archives/archives-2013-julydec/danger-ahead-auctions-undermined-by-new-consumer-protection
[https://perma.cc/8SWU-7SUV].
8
Id.
9
See generally BI Report, supra note 2.
10
See id.
11
See CHARLES W. SMITH, AUCTIONS: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF VALUE 3 (1989);
see also DOUG WOODHAM, ART COLLECTING TODAY: MARKET INSIGHTS FOR EVERYONE
PASSIONATE ABOUT ART 74–75 (2017).
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of both preparing the sale and a work of art that is no longer
commercially viable.12
For almost fifty years, federal and state regulatory regimes in the
United States have provided consumers rights of withdrawal similar
to those now available in the European Union (“E.U.”).13 Americans
do not seem to be generally aware of this device in the consumer
protection toolbox,14 or at least do not seem to frequently exercise
their right to withdraw.15 Indeed, the history of this right as intended
to remedy coercive, door-to-door sales practices has cast a shadow
over the American right of withdrawal and caused them to be overlooked as being narrow in scope.16 In fact, major U.S. auction house
contracts do not contain notice of the right to withdraw like their
European counterparts. 17 This omission may mean that auction
houses have not contemplated the application of the U.S. rights of
withdrawal. Alternatively, they may believe that the rights do not
apply to the auction of art in light of these rights’ intended purpose.
It is important not to assume that rights of withdrawal do not
apply to auction house contracts. An agreement between the
consumer and the auction house can meet the definition of an offpremises contract18 depending on the circumstances of the sale.19 If
that happens and the consumer has not been given notice of their
right to withdraw, the cooling-off period may extend indefinitely
and the costs of administering a return will increase.20
This Note first surveys U.S. cooling-off rules in order to clarify
whether the right to withdraw in fact applies to art auctions such that

12

See Valentin, supra note 7.
See Jeff Sovern, Written Notice of Cooling-off Periods: A Forty-Year Natural
Experiment in Illusory Consumer Protection and the Relative Effectiveness of Oral and
Written Disclosures, 75 U. PITT. L. REV. 333, 333 (2014).
14
Sánchez Abril, supra note 1, at 18.
15
Sovern, supra note 13, at 333.
16
See Omri Ben-Shahar & Eric A. Posner, The Right to Withdraw in Contract Law, 40
J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 115 (2011).
17
Compare Conditions of Online-Only Sale, supra note 5, with Conditions of Sale, supra
note 5.
18
The term “off-premises contracts” as used in this Note, refers to contracts signed at
any location other than the seller’s business premises, e.g., the buyer’s or seller’s home.
19
See infra Part II.B.2.
20
See infra Appendix A.
13
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consignors may withdraw from an auction or that winning bidders
may rescind a purchase. After examining the broad language and
common law application of these rules as well as the similarity of
auction house transactions to door-to-door sales, this Note
determines that under a literal reading, art auctions are plausibly
subject to withdrawal rights.21
However, withdrawal rights cannot be justified at art auctions
under the consumer advocate perspective because their application
would materially harm the value of the artwork on the auction block,
pose a significant challenge to the auction business, and fail to meet
the redistributive objectives of consumer protection policy.22 Thus,
while buyers have not yet prevailed in invoking the right to
withdraw against an art auction house,23 and the extent of this problem is not entirely clear, the potential certainly is.
In order to prevent these inequitable and undesired outcomes,
this Note will seek to establish that U.S. withdrawal rights should
not apply to art auctions and recommends an explicit carve-out
under the federal regulation with the hope that the states will follow
suit.24 This result would fit with the general principles of behavioral
economic scholarship and the intended purpose of the cooling-off
rules. Alternatively, if such an amendment to the federal cooling-off
rule is rejected, this Note recommends that auction houses mitigate
associated risks by amending their contracts to include notice of the
right to withdraw and take steps to minimize the risk of cancellation
rights arising inadvertently.25

21

See infra Part II.
See infra Parts I; Part III.
23
See generally Morris v. Steffes Grp., Inc., 924 N.W.2d 491, 496–97 (Iowa 2019),
reh’g denied, (Mar. 28, 2019); Vaks v. Ryan, 2012 Mass. App. Div. 17 (Mass. Dist. Ct.
2012), award vacated, 2014 Mass. App. Div. 37 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 2014); Holm v. Berner,
No. 06-CA-140, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 3148 (Ohio Ct. App. June 29, 2007). Notably,
rights of withdrawal have been applied to transactions with art galleries, where courts have
allowed art collectors to cancel deals. See generally Pritzker v. Krishna Gallery of Asian
Arts, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14398 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 1996); Vom Lehn v. Astor Art
Galleries, Ltd., 380 N.Y.S.2d 532 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976).
24
See infra Part IV.
25
An example of such steps includes signing agreements only at the auction house
business premises.
22
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Part I of this Note recounts the origin and basis of withdrawal
rights for off-premises contracts in the United States. It then
examines the laws that define rights of withdrawal in all fifty states,
including a federal regulation, in terms of their substantive
prohibitions, their scope, and the remedies that they provide
consumers. Part II discusses how art is distinguishable from
common consumer goods; additionally, this Part outlines the
respective contracts between auction houses, consignors, and
winning bidders. Eventually, Part II evaluates whether U.S.
withdrawal rights plausibly cover the sale of art at auction. Part III
analyzes the consequences of applying the right to withdraw to art
auctions, and the various incentives of consignors and bidders to
take advantage of this right to avoid a contract. Ultimately, Part IV
proposes three possible amendments to the federal withdrawal right
that would minimize the substantial costs this right may create at art
auctions: (1) an exception for art auctions or the sale of art; (2)
imposition of a cancellation fee; and, alternatively, (3) an exclusion
for transactions over a maximum purchase price.
I. OVERVIEW OF RIGHTS OF WITHDRAWAL
A. Rationale Behind Rights of Withdrawal
1. Regulatory and State Legislative Purposes
The regulatory and legislative rationale underpinning withdrawal rights is to protect consumers from sales techniques that
usurp
their
rational
decision-making process and exploit their lack of expertise. 26 A
26
See, e.g., N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 425 (“The purpose of this act is to afford consumers
a “cooling-off” period to cancel contracts which are entered into as a result of high pressure
door-to-door sales tactics.”); see also Fred S. McChesney, Behavioral Economics: Old
Wine in Irrelevant New Bottles?, 21 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 43, 68 (2013) (discussing that
cooling-off rules are founded on principles of bounded rationality, “justified by claims of
ignorance and other failures of consumer choice”); Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler,
Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1162, 1188 (2003)
(discussing that cooling-off rules make the most sense in circumstances where consumers
are particularly likely to make decisions they will regret, i.e., “when two conditions are
met: (1) people are making decisions that they make infrequently and for which they
therefore lack a great deal of experience, and (2) emotions are likely to be running high”).
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cooling-off period can protect consumers from their own “heat-ofthe-moment” impulses by allowing them to reevaluate contracts
without the salesman present and without resorting to breach of
contract remedies. 27 Thus, withdrawal rights can improve the
bargaining position of consumers, and as such are powerful tools for
consumer protection.28
In the context of door-to-door sales, withdrawal rights were
created to balance fairness in a shopping environment that renders
consumers more vulnerable to entering into contracts that go against
their best interests. 29 Consumers in the comfort of their homes
already occupy a less deliberative state of mind and therefore
become more susceptible to overestimating the value of a purchase
or underestimating the risks of poor contract terms.30 What’s more,
when a door-to-door salesman intrudes into the privacy of one’s
home, the surprise element catches the consumer off-guard.31 The
consumer may also feel obliged to listen to an overzealous
salesman’s pitch and agree to the proposed contract in order to get
the seller to leave their home.32

27

See Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance
Reduces Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197, 239 (2012) (noting that “contract law
provides remedies, but enforcement is costly and largely impractical.”); see also Colin
Camerer, et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for
“Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1239 (2003); Sunstein & Thaler,
supra note 26, at 1191.
28
See Rekaiti & Van den Bergh, supra note 1, at 371; Oren Bar-Gill & Omri BenShahar, Exit From Contract, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 151, 151 (2014) (“Exit from contract is
one of the most powerful consumer protection devices, freeing consumers from bad deals
and keeping businesses honest.”).
29
See Oren Bar-Gill, The Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L.
REV 749, 749 (2008); see also Camerer et al., supra note 27, at 1215, 1238.
30
Michael R. Mattioli, Cooling-Off & Secondary Markets: Consumer Choice in the
Digital Domain, 15 VA. J.L. & TECH. 227, 236–37 (2010); see also Ben-Shahar & Posner,
supra note 16, at 120; Harry M. Brittenham, et al., The Direct Selling Industry: An
Empirical Study, 16 UCLA L. REV. 890, 895–922 (1969).
31
FTC Cooling-Off Period for Door-To-Door Sales, 37 Fed. Reg. 22933, 22937–39
(Oct. 26, 1972) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 429) [hereinafter FTC Cooling-Off Rule
Statement of Basis and Purpose] (“The door to door selling technique strips from the
consumer one of the fundamentals in his role as an informed purchaser, the decision as to
when, where, and how he will present himself to the marketplace.”).
32
One consumer explained why they listened to the sales pitch and ultimately signed
the contract this way: “I was frightened of the man. I didn’t know how to get rid of him.”
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Additionally, studies show that door-to-door salesmen were
trained to utilize coercive sales tactics to “make the kill.” 33
Problematic sales practices included badgering, harassment, and
intimidation. For example, consumers complained that they were
pressured into deals by aggressive salesmen who spent hours “with
them late at night making numerous oral promises, wearing down
their resistance and even intimidating them.” 34 Another concern
included sales pitches that convinced the consumer that they must
purchase “now or never” because the seller offers unusual goods or
a special deal that cannot be obtained elsewhere.35 The consumer,
who may already feel overwhelmed by the circumstances of an
unexpected house call, may find it difficult to fully evaluate all
available alternatives with reasoned judgment and appropriate
self-interest in the face of the salesman’s presence in the home
and insistence upon an immediate response. 36 This situation
is fraught with the possibility of undue influence, intimidation,
and over-reaching.37
A cooling-off period alleviates the immediacy of the salesman’s
influence and lessens the element of surprise by providing the
consumer additional time after signing the contract to reconsider the
commitment. 38 During this extra time, consumers can rationally
weigh the purchase decision against their needs and resources,
consult with others, and even engage in comparative shopping
before the contract becomes irrevocable.39 In this way, cooling-off

FTC Cooling-Off Rule Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 31, at 22938 n.39; see
also Camerer et al., supra note 27, at 1215, 1238.
33
See, e.g., FTC Cooling-Off Rule Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 31, at
22938 n.42; see also Brittenham, et al., supra note 30, at 890.
34
FTC Cooling-Off Rule Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 31, at 22937 n.32.
35
See Rekaiti & Van den Bergh, supra note 1, at 378.
36
See generally FTC Cooling-Off Rule Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 31.
37
See generally id.
38
See Byron D. Sher, The Cooling-Off Period in Door-to-Door Sales, 15 UCLA L. REV.
717, 717 (1968) (“The interval immediately following the point at which a salesman
secures the buyer’s signature has been called the ‘decompression’ period, a graphic
description of the decline in the intensity of a consumer’s desire to possess the goods or
services often experienced after the salesman has departed. And the interval within which
the consumer is permitted by statute to cancel his contract or offer is commonly referred to
as the ‘cooling-off’ period.”).
39
FTC Cooling-Off Rule Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 31, at 22942.
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period rules are able to “redistribute” the transaction costs between
the contracting parties and balance the bargaining power between
consumers and sellers.40
2. Contract Theory
From a contract law perspective, the temporary impaired
judgment caused by a doorstep sale also justifies paternalistic laws
such as withdrawal rights.41 These rights formally recognize that
the consumer’s perceived freedom to enter the contract may have
been compromised. 42 A cooling-off period can encourage sound
judgement and diminish the influence of unfair persuasion on
contract formation.43
However, restricting an individual’s freedom to commit to a
legally enforceable promise is no small matter. 44 Most scholars

40

See Rekaiti & Van den Bergh, supra note 1, at 373. To be clear, the cooling-off rule
is intended to redistribute to the consumer what is taken away from the seller. Id. at 374. If
the consumer were asked to pay for the withdrawal right through depreciation costs,
cancellation fees, or even higher prices, the consumer would be in the same, or worse,
position than prior to the implementation of the rule. See id. Any such result would
undermine the redistributive goals of consumer protection law. Id.
41
See Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763,
786–87 (1983). Any legal rule that proscribes action to prevent people from acting against
their own interests is paternalistic. Id. at 763, 797.
42
Sánchez Abril, supra note 1, at 33 (“[F]rom a dogmatic point of view, the right of
withdrawal is linked to a defective formation of the consumer’s will, which is offset with
the power . . . to terminate the contract.”).
43
Kronman, supra note 41, at 788. Yet, Professor Kronman cautions that “[t]his
argument . . . is overbroad: The ways in which a person’s judgment may be impaired are
protean, but we quite properly refuse to recognize lack of judgment as a general defense
against the claim that one has failed to meet his contractual obligations. What explains the
law’s selectivity in this regard and the particular pattern of restrictions it enforces?” Id. at
794.
44
Id. at 795 (“[T]he requirement of a cooling-off period has antidemocratic
implications, which explains why we demand a special justification for these restrictions
and would never think of imposing a cooling-off period in every contractual relationship.”);
Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1277,
1364 (1984) (“[A withdrawal right] enhances people’s freedom by giving them a chance
to decide what they actually want without excessive pressure, and it limits their freedom
by prohibiting them from contracting as early as they might want to. Both the existence
and the nonexistence of such a rule can be praised—and also condemned—for its
contribution to the formation of voluntary contracts.”).
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agree that such legal intervention should not apply in every
contractual relationship.45 As one scholar explains:
The right of withdrawal implies above all the
acknowledgment of a very relevant exception to the
fundamental dogma of contract law: the duty to
fulfill what is promised (pacta sunt servanda). For
that reason, no legal system can grant the contracting
parties the power to withdraw in a generalized and
indiscriminate fashion, but rather on an extraordinary basis and only in cases that are
sufficiently justified. Otherwise, the complete
private contract system would be contingent upon the
whim of the buyer of goods and services, which, in
turn, would imperil the very functioning of
the market.46
In fact, Oren Bar-Gill argues that withdrawal rights should be
based on strong market-specific evidence of consumer mistakes that
create substantial welfare costs. 47 He recommends empirical
research to determine if the mistakes are systemic to an industry:
“regulation should only be considered where such specific evidence
proves the existence, in the specific market, of a behavioral market
failure that generates significant welfare costs.”48 Cass Sunstein and
Richard Thaler also emphasize the need for welfare analysis that
balances the costs and benefits of such programs.49
45
See, e.g., OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT 42–43 (2012) (“There are many
consumer markets and many more consumer contracts. Each market is embedded in a
unique historical, institutional, political, and legal context. Most importantly, the
underlying currents of consumer psychology and market forces, while following common
patterns, manifest in unique ways in different markets. When it comes to considering
regulatory intervention, a detailed market analysis is imperative.”); Yilma Desta, supra
note 4, at 4 (“A far reaching instrument like withdrawal right has to be crafted with care
and having taken due account of all potential effects of extending the right to a wide range
of consumer contracts.”); see also Camerer et al., supra note 27, at 1239; Sunstein &
Thaler, supra note 26, at 1166.
46
Sánchez Abril, supra note 1, at 43 (emphasis added).
47
See Bar-Gill, supra note 29, at 790.
48
Id. at 801–02.
49
Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 26, at 1166 (“[Paternalistic] programs should be
designed using a type of welfare analysis, one in which a serious attempt is made to
measure the costs and benefits of outcomes.”).
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Yet, there is doubt about whether enough evidence even
supports utilizing withdrawal rights.50 For example, a review of the
federal right of withdrawal’s “Statement of Basis and Purpose”
shows a lack of quantitative analysis. 51 The Federal Trade
Commission (“Commission” or “FTC”) actually dismissed
testimony of state officials who concluded similar state rules did not
benefit consumers on the basis of statistical evidence.52 In fact, the
FTC primarily relied on anecdotal evidence and a survey that
contained a disclaimer of its validity. 53 While such anecdotal
evidence is more illustrative and poignant, it is often unreliable.54
Further, at least from examining the administrative history of the
federal rule, there is no evidence to indicate that empirical research
on the art market was used to support enactment of the right of
withdrawal.55 Those favoring the extension of the withdrawal right
to the art market must be sensitive to the potential economic
ramifications because this right defies a one-size-fits-all
framework.56 Failing to take account of the unique dynamics of the
art market and indiscriminately using withdrawal rights could harm
the industry as well as consumers.57
B. Rights of Withdrawal in U.S. Off-Premises Contracts
The “radical” concept of providing consumers with the right to
withdraw from door-to-door sales contracts originated with the
50

JOSEPH P. MULHOLLAND, SUMMARY REPORT ON THE FTC BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
CONFERENCE 22 (Apr. 20, 2007) (“Notwithstanding the apparent widespread acceptance of
cooling-off rules, they do not appear to have been subjected to the kind of asymmetric
paternalism or unfairness analysis discussed at the conference. For example, the FTC rule
appears to have been created without the benefit of any systematic research to document
its value.”) (emphasis added). But see FTC Rule Concerning Cooling-Off Period for Sales
Made at Homes or at Certain Other Locations, 60 Fed. Reg. 54180 (Oct. 20, 1995)
[hereinafter 1995 FTC Cooling-Off Rule Non-Substantive Amendments] (noting the FTC
conducted a regulatory review of the FTC Cooling-Off Rule in the mid-1990s and
concluded that the rule provides benefits to consumers).
51
See McChesney, supra note 26, at 69.
52
See id.
53
See id.
54
See STEFAN H. KRIEGER & RICHARD K. NUEMAN, Jr. ESSENTIAL LAWYERING SKILLS
41 (2015).
55
See generally FTC Cooling-Off Rule Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 31.
56
See Sánchez Abril, supra note 1, at 43.
57
See id.
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English Committee on Consumer Protection in 1962, which
recommended providing buyers a three-day period to cancel
installment contracts. 58 The idea was transplanted to the United
States within the year when New York and Pennsylvania enacted
the earliest right-to-withdraw statutes.59 In 1970, the FTC published
a notice of proposed rulemaking that provided for a withdrawal right
in door-to-door sales and other off-premises contracts.60 As concern
for consumer welfare gained momentum, other states introduced
right-of-withdrawal statutes such that today all fifty states have their
own law in effect.61
1. Federal Regulation
In 1972, the FTC promulgated the “Cooling-off Period For Sales
Made At Homes Or At Certain Other Locations” (“Cooling-Off
Rule” or “Rule”) to provide consumers the unilateral right to cancel
transactions without justification or cost.62 The Rule grants buyers
a cooling-off period of three business days to exercise their right
to withdraw.63
A fairly broad range of contracts are subject to cancellation
under the Rule. The Rule defines door-to-door sales as transactions
where the seller of consumer goods or services64 personally solicits
58

See Sher, supra note 38, at 717–18.
Wade R. Thompson, A New Remedy for California Consumers: The Right to Cancel
a Home Solicitation Contract, 3 PAC. L.J. 633, 633 n.7 (1972) (noting enactment of 73 PA.
STAT. ANN. § 500-202(c)(4) and N.Y. PERS. PROP. §§ 425–430 in 1962). But see Byron D.
Sher, supra note 38, at 719 (noting enactment of 73 PA. STAT. ANN. § 500-202(c)(4) in
1966 and MICH. STAT. ANN. § 19.417(202)(c)(4) in 1965 as the earliest right of withdrawal
statutes in the United States).
60
FTC Cooling-Off Rule Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 31, at 22933.
61
See infra Appendix A.
62
FTC Rule Concerning Cooling-Off Period for Sales Made at Homes or at Certain
Other Locations, 16 C.F.R. § 429 (2018). To clarify that the rule is intended to cover more
than the paradigm door-to-door sale, the Rule was amended in 1995 to change the name
from “Cooling-Off Period for Door-to-Door Sales” to “Rule Concerning Cooling-Off
Period for Sales Made at Homes or at Certain Other Locations.” See 1995 FTC CoolingOff Rule Non-Substantive Amendments, supra note 50, at 54180.
63
16 C.F.R. § 429.1 (“You, the buyer, may cancel this transaction at any time prior to
midnight of the third business day after the date of this transaction.”); 16 C.F.R. § 429.0(f)
(defining business day as any day except Sunday or a federal holiday).
64
16 C.F.R. § 429.0(b) (defining consumer goods or services as those primarily used for
personal, family or household purposes).
59
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the sale and the buyer makes the offer or agreement to purchase at
some location other than the seller’s place of business, even where
the buyer initiated contact.65 If the sale was finalized at the buyer’s
home, the consumer may cancel a contract valued at $25 or above;
if consummated at another location, the minimum threshold
is $130.66
The Rule was primarily addressed to direct sellers, 67 i.e.,
salesmen who capitalize on person-to-person contact to sell at locations where consumers have not yet made the conscious decision to
enter a store to make a purchase.68 For instance, drafters of the Rule
contemplated door-to-door sales of, inter alia, home appliances,
encyclopedia subscriptions, and home improvement services.69
The limited purpose of the Rule was to remedy the problem of
sales obtained through deceptive and high-pressure sales tactics
used on consumers who are vulnerable to having their judgement
swayed by an unexpected sales pitch. 70 In particular, the FTC
justified the Rule on five problems characteristic of personal
solicitation sales:
 Deception by the seller in getting inside the door;
 High-pressure sales tactics;
 Misrepresentation of the quality, price or
characteristics of the product;
 High price for low-quality product; and

65
16 C.F.R. § 429.0(a) (defining a door-to-door sale as “[a] sale, lease, or rental of
consumer goods or services in which the seller or his representative personally solicits the
sale, including those in response to or following an invitation by the buyer, and the buyer’s
agreement or offer to purchase is made at a place other than the place of business of the
seller (e.g., sales at the buyer’s residence or at facilities rented on a temporary or shortterm basis, such as hotel or motel rooms, convention centers, fairgrounds and restaurants,
or sales at the buyer’s workplace or in dormitory lounges) . . . .”).
66
16 C.F.R. § 429.0(a).
67
FTC Cooling-Off Rule Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 31, at 22936,
22913.
68
Business Guidance Concerning Multi-Level Marketing, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
(Jan. 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/business-guidanceconcerning-multi-level-marketing. [https://perma.cc/C9P6-VLDE]. For background
information on the direct selling industry see generally Brittenham, et al., supra note 30.
69
FTC Cooling-Off Rule Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 31, at 22936.
70
1995 FTC Cooling-Off Rule Non-Substantive Amendments, supra note 50, at 54184.
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Nuisance created by the unexpected salesman’s
house call.71
To limit application of the Rule to transactions where such
abuses were found, certain sales have been excluded. The definition
of “door-to-door sales” excludes: (1) transactions made pursuant to
prior negotiations at the seller’s trade premises, 72 and (2)
transactions conducted and executed entirely by mail or telephone.73
These exclusions recognize that the pressure to buy is less intense
when the buyer can easily escape an aggressive sales pitch by
leaving the business establishment or hanging up the phone.74
Other exemptions have been added for sellers of arts and crafts
at fairs 75 and sellers of motor vehicles sold at auction. 76 Clearly,
consumers purposely attending an auction or fair cannot be subject
to an unexpected sales pitch. 77 Additionally, the consumer at an
auction or fair has the opportunity to shop around between different
vendors; therefore, misrepresentations that characterize doorstep
sales are less likely.78 Notably, in adopting these amendments, the
Commission stressed that the Rule continues to apply to sales made
“at a place other than the place of business of the seller . . . . [h]ence,
the Rule applies to public auctions, tent sales, and sales at fairs.”79
Arguably, this explicit inclusion of public auctions encompasses art
auctions.80
71

FTC Cooling-Off Rule Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 31, at 22937.
16 C.F.R. § 429.0(a)(1).
73
16 C.F.R. § 429.0(a)(4).
74
See 1995 FTC Cooling-Off Rule Non-Substantive Amendments, supra note 50, at
54184.
75
16 C.F.R. § 429.3(b).
76
16 C.F.R. § 429.3(a). These exemptions were prompted by a letter petition from
Public Auto Auction. See FTC Rule on Cooling-Off Period for Door-to-Door Sales, 52
Fed. Reg. 29539, 29540–41 (Aug. 10, 1987) [hereinafter 1987 FTC Cooling-Off Rule
Proposed Exemptions]. In adopting the amendments, the Commission explained that an
auctioneer is not necessarily a “seller” under the Rule, and that the Rule would not apply
to the auctioneer unless they are involved in directly selling goods or services to buyers.
See FTC Rule on Cooling-Off Period for Door-to-Door Sales, 53 Fed. Reg. 45455, 45458
n.23 (Nov. 10, 1988) [hereinafter 1988 FTC Cooling-Off Rule Final Exemptions].
77
See 1987 FTC Cooling-Off Rule Proposed Exemptions, supra note 76, at 29541.
78
Id.
79
1988 FTC Cooling-Off Rule Final Exemptions, supra note 76, at 45457 n.10
(emphasis added).
80
See infra Part II.C.
72
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Additionally, the Rule makes it an unfair or deceptive practice
for the seller to fail to give the buyer both a verbal notice and a clear
and conspicuous written notice about the buyer’s right to cancel at
the time of purchase.81 The Rule requires that the contract include
duplicate copies of the notice of the buyer’s right to withdraw and a
specifically worded cancellation form, all of which must be in
boldface type with a particular minimum size font and substantially
comply with the language set forth in the regulation. 82 These
draconian notice requirements recognize that the right to withdraw
would be useless if consumers were not fully informed of their rights
before the cooling-off period expires.83
The Commission considered whether failure to meet these notice
requirements should extend the cooling-off period.84 However, the
Rule was not intended to be a “buyer’s remorse program.” 85 As
such, these remedial proposals were repeatedly rejected as too punitive to adopt.86
Within ten days after cancellation, the Rule requires the seller to
give the buyer a full refund of any payment or return any goods
bartered in exchange.87 Because these provisions were designed to
minimize the burden on the consumer, the seller bears the risk if they
perform services prior to the expiration of the cooling-off period.88
Thus, consumers are assured free withdrawal.89

81

See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 429.1.
See id.
83
See id.
84
See 1995 FTC Cooling-Off Rule Non-Substantive Amendments, supra note 50, at
54185 (discussing that tolling the cooling-off period with notice would penalize the seller
and is too remedial an amendment to adopt); FTC Cooling-Off Rule Statement of Basis and
Purpose, supra note 31, at 22957 (same).
85
1995 FTC Cooling-Off Rule Non-Substantive Amendments, supra note 50, at 54184
(“The Cooling-Off Rule was not intended to be a federal ‘satisfaction guarantee’
requirement or ‘buyers’ remorse’ insurance program . . . . The Rule instead has the limited
purpose of correcting the specific problem of sales being obtained through high pressure
and deceptive sales tactics used on consumers at times and places in which consumers
typically may not expect to be solicited for sales and find it difficult to extricate themselves
from the situation.”) (emphasis added).
86
See 16 C.F.R. § 429.2.
87
See 16 C.F.R. § 429.1(g).
88
See FTC Cooling-Off Rule Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 31, at 22947.
89
See id.
82
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Importantly, the Federal Trade Commission Act does not create
a private cause of action.90 Therefore, only the FTC has the power
to initiate an enforcement action for violations of the Cooling-Off
Rule. 91 However, the Rule is not intended to preempt state
law where greater protection is given to consumers; thus, consumers
may take advantage of state statutes that provide private rights
of action.92
Finally, because the right of withdrawal is a consumer protection
right, parties cannot expressly waive or contract away this right.93
The federal regulation and some states explicitly void any waiver of
the right to withdraw.94

90
The court in Rojas v. Ygrene Energy Fund, Inc. specifically addressed the cancellation
rights under the Rule, as well as the FTCA in general, finding that a claim brought by an
individual seeking to cancel a contract will be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Rojas v. Ygrene Energy Fund, Inc., No. 18-cv-579, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
60945, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2018).
91
See id. at *2.
92
See FTC Cooling-Off Rule Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 31, at 22958
(“If the State cooling-off laws give the consumer greater benefit and protection in regard
to notice, time for election of the cancellation remedy, or in transactions exempted from
this rule, there seems to be no reason to deprive the affected consumer of these additional
benefits.”). Where a claim does proceed to trial, the Rule does not provide for remedies in
addition to those otherwise applicable to unfair and deceptive acts or practices under the
FTCA. Crystal v. W. & Callahan, Inc., 328 Md. 318, 328 (Ct. App. Md. 1992). In United
States v. Union Circulation Co., the court held that penalties that take into account the
injury to the public, prior history of violations, defendant’s knowledge of the Rule and their
financial resources could be imposed for violation of the Cooling-Off Rule. United States.
v. Union Circulation Co., No. C81-997A, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18794, at *11–12 (N.D.
Ga. Mar. 4, 1983) (ordering defendant sellers of magazine subscriptions to pay a civil
penalty of $15,000 and attorney’s fees for violation of the Cooling-Off Rule).
93
See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 429.1(d) (“[I]t constitutes an unfair and deceptive act or practice
for any seller to . . . [i]nclude in any door-to-door contract or receipt any . . . any waiver
of any of the rights to which the buyer is entitled under this section including specifically
the buyer’s right to cancel the sale.”).
94
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-5002(D) (2018) (“Any provision of a contract,
offer or agreement that waives a buyer’s right of cancellation under this section is void and
has no effect.”); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1689.12 (Deering 2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §
4404(4) (2018); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-13 (2018); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 481C-2(4)
(LexisNexis 2018); IOWA CODE ANN. § 555A.4(2) (2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-640(b)(4)
(2018); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.460 (LexisNexis 2018); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §
14-302(1)(ii)(4) (LexisNexis 2018); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 93, § 48(G) (LexisNexis 2018);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-21(A)(4) (LexisNexis 2018); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-18-08.1
(2018); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 37-24-5.5 (2018).

2020]

CAVEAT VENDOR

823

2. State Statutes
Every state has a consumer protection law that recognizes a
buyer’s right to withdraw from contracts consummated outside of
the seller’s business premises. 95 While most state rights are
substantially similar to the federal rule,96 the state laws differ in at
least two key ways.
First, the state right-to-withdraw statutes tend to be more
protective of consumers. For example, most states go beyond the
federal rule by providing consumers a private right of action, and
some even impose a monetary penalty against sellers for violation
of the statute.97 Critically, state statutes are not preempted unless
they provide less protection to consumers.98 Thus, provisions that
provide a private enforcement mechanism will not be preempted;
however, cancellation fee clauses or exemptions with no counterpart
in the federal rule will be preempted.99 For instance, certain states

95

See infra Appendix A.
Like the federal rule, most states allow consumers a cooling-off period of three days
after signing a contract to reconsider purchases of goods or services above twenty-five
dollars. Alaska is the only state in the nation that permits the buyer to exercise their right
to cancel for as long as five days, and lowers the threshold of contracts subject to
cancellation to a minimum of $10. See ALASKA STAT. § 45.02.350(a) (2018). A few states
like New York, incorporate exceptions established in the federal Rule for transactions made
pursuant to prior negotiations at the seller’s trade premises and those conducted entirely
over the telephone or mail. See, e.g., N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 426(1)(a) (Consol. 2018)
(defining the term door-to-door sale does not include a transaction made pursuant to prior
negotiations at seller’s trade premises); N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 426(1)(c) (defining the
term door-to-door sale does not include a transaction conducted and consummated entirely
by mail or telephone, and without any other contact between the buyer and the seller or its
representative prior to performance of the services).
97
See, e.g., N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 429(3) (“If the seller refuses within the period
prescribed by subdivision one to return all payments made by the buyer, he shall be liable
to the buyer for the said payments and if the buyer is successful in his action therefor or
appeal thereon, the court shall award him one hundred dollars plus reasonable attorney’s
fees and costs, in addition to such payments.”).
98
See 16 C.F.R. § 429.2.
99
See id.
96
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include exceptions for “fairs,” 100 “catalogue sales,” 101 and
“auctions.”102 Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin are the only states
that expressly exempt auctions. 103 However, these general
exceptions for auctions have no counterpart in the federal rule.104
Therefore, consumers would continue to have a right to withdraw
from contracts with auctioneers under the federal regulation.105
Second, in contrast to the federal rule, the state approach to the
notice requirement is much more remedial. Of the states that require
notice of the right to withdraw,106 seven expressly provide that the
contract is void and unenforceable for lack of notice. 107
Additionally, while the FTC has repeatedly decided not to penalize
the seller for noncompliance with the notice requirement, thirtyeight states provide that the cooling-off period does not begin to run
100

See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.021(1)(b) (LexisNexis 2018) (A door-to-door sale
“does not include a sale, lease, or rental made at any fair.”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50640(c)(1)(G) (2018) (statute does not apply to a sale “that occurs on the state fairgrounds”);
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 83.710(2)(g) (LexisNexis 2018) (statute does not apply to “a sale
of arts and crafts at a fair”); 6 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-2(3)(vi) (2018) (statute does not apply
to a sale “that involves arts and crafts sold at fairs”).
101
See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2711.1(A)(1) (2018) (statute does not apply to “a
catalogue sale”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:16C-61.5 (LexisNexis 2018) (“This section does
not apply to . . . catalog sales where an order is placed by mail or telephone.”); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 423.201(2) (LexisNexis 2018) (“‘Consumer approval transaction’ does not include
a catalog sale that is not accompanied by any other solicitation or a consumer loan
conducted and consummated entirely by mail.”).
102
See infra note 103.
103
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325G.06 Subd. 2(5) (2018) (home solicitation does not include
“a sale by public auction”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.21(F)(6) (LexisNexis 2018)
(“‘Consumer goods or services’ does not include . . . [t]he sale of property at an auction
by an auctioneer licensed by the department of agriculture under Chapter 4707 of the
Revised Code.”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 423.201(1) (“‘Consumer approval transaction’ means
a consumer transaction other than a sale or lease or listing for sale of real property or a sale
of goods at auction.”).
104
See 16 C.F.R. § 429.
105
See, e.g., Miriam H. Sheline, Home Solicitation Sales Act, in Ohio Consumer Law §
3:5 (Thomson Reuters ed., 2018–2019). But see 16 C.F.R. § 429.3(a) (providing an
exception for auction of motor vehicles under the Rule).
106
Forty-eight states require mandatory language that explains the buyer’s right to cancel
in addition to oral notice. Alaska and Georgia are the only exceptions. See ALASKA STAT.
§ 45.02.350 (2018); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-6 (2018).
107
See ALASKA STAT. § 45.02.35; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-5004(B) (2018); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 42-135a (2018); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 555A.1–555A.6 (2018); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 51-18-04 (2018); 6 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-4(a) (2018); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 601.201 (LexisNexis 2018).
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until actual notice is given to the buyer.108 In these states the cooling-off period becomes indefinite without notice.109 As a result, consumers in these states may cancel long after services have been performed and sellers will still have to bear the burdens of
these costs.110
These robust state-level protections take into account that sellers
can include notice of the withdrawal right in all contracts signed off
premises in order to limit the timeframe of the cooling-off period.111
The California Court of Appeals noted: “If this result appears to deal
harshly with merchants who have fully performed under their
contracts, it seems clear to this court that the message which the
Legislature has attempted to convey . . . is ‘Caveat Vendor.’”112
II. INTERSECTION OF ART AUCTIONS WITH U.S. RIGHTS OF
WITHDRAWAL
A. Art Is Not a Commodity and Exists in an “Economic
Microcosm”
While U.S. rights of withdrawal are context-specific to door-todoor sales, these rules are not market-specific.113 As a result, these
rights are over-inclusive and pose a threat to the stability of the art

108

See e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1689.7(g) (Deering 2018) (“Until the seller has complied
with this section the buyer may cancel the home solicitation contract or offer.”). For a
comprehensive list see infra Appendix A.
109
See, e.g., Weatherall Aluminum Prods. Co. v. Scott, 71 Cal. App. 3d 245, 247 (1977)
(holding defendant homeowner retained their right to withdraw because notice of the
buyer’s cancellation right was not given, thus defendant was permitted to cancel a home
improvement contract over a year after services were performed). Alabama is the only state
that statutorily caps the buyer’s extended right to withdraw to one year. ALA. CODE § 5-1912 (LexisNexis 2018). Colorado also caps the buyer’s extended right to withdraw to three
years when notice requirements have not been met. COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3-403(3) (2018).
110
See Weatherall Aluminum Prods. Co., 71 Cal. App. 3d at 247. In one extreme case,
an Ohio court permitted cancellation nearly six years after the contract was signed. See
Knight v. Colazzo, No. 24110, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 5521, at **12 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008).
111
Weatherall Aluminum Prods. Co., 71 Cal. App. 3d at 249.
112
Id. (emphasis added). “Caveat vendor” is a play on the phrase “caveat emptor,” or
“buyer beware.” Essentially, this term inverts the principle that the buyer should be
responsible for due diligence prior to a sale and assigns that responsibility to the seller.
113
See supra Part I.A.
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market. 114 Application of these rights to the auction of art is
particularly problematic because art is a unique non-commodity and
“exist[s] in an economic microcosm seemingly unbound by many
traditional free market principles.”115
Art is not a commodity in the sense that coffee and computers
are commodities. It is not mass-produced or fungible. 116
Importantly, the price of art is highly subjective, unlike commodities
that are valued in terms of material, labor, and production.117 Art is
distinguishable from common consumer goods by the intangible
factors that determine an artwork’s price. 118 Valuation primarily
depends on authenticity, provenance, 119 and uniqueness, 120 in
addition to historical context and condition. 121 Secondary factors
that impact price include the social dynamics of both collecting and
auctions—for instance, current market trends and personal
motivations, such as taste, competition, and desire for prestige or
publicity.122 Importantly, the value of art is also largely dependent
on prior sales. 123 For example, art that fails to sell is considered
“burnt,” and as a result loses significant market value.124

114

See supra Part I.A.
See Sebastian Harter-Bachmann, Truth in Art and Law: Allocating the Risks
Associated With Attribution in the Art Auction House, DURHAM E-THESES, DURHAM U. 9
(2007), available at http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/2411/ [https://perma.cc/H3W7-Y3X5]; see
also Hunter S. Higgins, A Tale of Tulips: A Counterpoint to Courts Codifying Collectibles,
10 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 223, 227–28 (2017).
116
See generally SMITH, supra note 11, at 28; Higgins, supra note 115, at 228.
117
See Harter-Bachmann, supra note 115, at 9.
118
See Henri Neuendorf, Art Demystified: What Determines an Artwork’s Value?,
ARTNET (June 29, 2016), https://news.artnet.com/market/art-demystified-artworks-value533990 [https://perma.cc/DRE6-YWND].
119
Provenance refers to the origins and history of ownership of a work of art, which can
ideally be traced back to the artist. See PATTY GERSTENBLITH, ART, CULTURAL HERITAGE,
AND THE LAW 385 (3d ed. 2012). Provenance research in addition to connoisseurship and
scientific testing can help confirm the authenticity of a work of art. See id.
120
Much like in the real estate market, art “[m]arket participants notably resist notions of
substitution, often refusing to qualify any one-of-a-kind item as ‘reasonably
interchangeable’ with another.” Higgins, supra note 115, at 228.
121
See Harter-Bachmann, supra note 115, at 6–9.
122
See SMITH, supra note 11, at 39.
123
See id. at 3.
124
See generally BI Report, supra note 2.
115
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These subjective and idiosyncratic factors make an artwork’s
valuation extremely sensitive to reputation. 125 For instance, if a
consignor or winning bidder “cools off” after the auction and
exercises their right to withdraw, the cancelled sale can cause the
artwork’s value to depreciate by as much as 55%.126
Further, art’s rarity and intangible aspects create dramatic shifts
in supply and demand, which render prices even more volatile.127
The opportunity to sell a piece of art arises relatively rarely because
there is such a small supply of art on the market and a small group
with sufficient resources to purchase these often expensive works.128
Due to this limited exchange market for art, perhaps the most
important function auction houses serve is to carefully arrange for
the supply of and demand for art to meet. 129 Therefore, inflated
demand by bidders or inflated supply by consignors at auction
through bad-faith contracts will cause dramatic fluctuations
in price.130 This economic analysis must be a part of the court’s, regulator’s, and legislature’s decisions to apply rights of withdrawal to
art auctions.131
B. Overview of Auction House Transactions
This Note focuses on the impact of withdrawal rights on the art
market within the context of the auction house because auctions are
a significant and transparent forum for setting the value of art in an
otherwise ambiguous market. 132 This Section will clarify the
disadvantages of extending withdrawal rights to the auction of art
by outlining the contractual framework at auction, auction house
transactions at issue, and the services which auction houses provide.

125

See Harter-Bachmann, supra note 115, at 7.
See Alan Beggs & Kathryn Graddy, Failure to Meet the Reserve Price: The Impact
on Returns to Art, CTR. ECON. POL’Y RES., July 2006, at 28, https://ssrn.com/
abstract=936971 [https://perma.cc/SR6C-2KG7].
127
See SMITH, supra note 11, at 28.
128
See Harter-Bachmann, supra note 115, at 7.
129
See id.
130
Valentin, supra note 7; see also Sánchez Abril, supra note 1 (cooling-off period
“legislation would invite bad-faith contracts, that is to say, orders signed by a purchaser
with the full intention of canceling the order the next day”.).
131
See supra Part I.A.2.
132
See Harter-Bachmann, supra note 115, at 9.
126
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1. Contractual Framework at Auction
Auction houses are trading platforms where sellers and buyers
exchange art. 133 However, in establishing this arrangement, both
sellers and buyers of art enter a contractual relationship as buyers
from the auction house.134 The seller, or consignor, consigns their
goods as part of a contract to purchase the auctioneer’s services
called a consignment agreement and thereby also subscribes to the
conditions of sale published in the auction catalogue.135 The buyer,
or winning bidder, contracts with the auction house for the purchase
of the auction lot.136 The bidder’s contract is formed once their offer
to purchase has been accepted “by the fall of the hammer” on the
auction block. 137 The winning bidder is subject to the buyer’s
invoice and is also bound by the conditions of sale.138 Because both
consignors and winning bidders qualify as buyers, they may have
rights of withdrawal against the seller, the auction house.139
2. Auction House Transactions at Issue
Most transactions with an auction house could qualify as
personal solicitations at locations other than the seller’s trade
premises because art transactions—at auction houses in particular—
are built on relationships. 140 Auction house art specialists 141 are
often invited to visit clients at home to offer free appraisals or advice
on conservation, and may take advantage of these encounters to
discuss new consignments and to gauge interest in potential

133

WOODHAM, supra note 11, at 31.
BRIAN W. HARVEY & FRANKLIN MEISEL, AUCTION LAW AND PRACTICE 189 (3d ed.
2006).
135
Id. Consignment agreements outline the terms of sale for each consignment and
provides that the auction house is an agent of the seller. See WOODHAM, supra note 11, at
34.
136
See HARVEY & MEISEL, supra note 134, at 189–90.
137
Id. at 190.
138
See id. at 189–90.
139
Granted that the sale was personally solicited, agreed to away from the seller’s
business premises, and intended for personal use. See supra Part I.
140
See Anna Rohleder, Which Auction House Is Right for You?, FORBES (Nov. 14, 2001,
12:01 AM), https://www.forbes.com/2001/11/14/1114connguide.html#123103b83f3b
[https://perma.cc/W5ZR-M4S3].
141
Specialists are professionals with advanced degrees in a particular field, such as postmodern and contemporary art. WOODHAM, supra note 11, at 12.
134
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purchases.142 The personal interaction during these home visits may
be perceived as solicitations and result in contracts signed
away from the business premises that inadvertently give rise to
cancellation rights.143
In addition, auctions are formally open to the public, but
consignors and winning bidders will necessarily be limited to the
very small pool of people that have the resources to trade in art,
antiques, and unique collectibles.144 This pool includes art dealers,
arts institutions, and private art collectors.145 Notably, purchases by
art dealers for resale and museums for exhibition qualify as
purchases for “business purposes.” 146 As such, those transactions
will not be covered by withdrawal rights.147 The right of withdrawal
only applies to consumer goods or services used “primarily for
personal, family or household purposes.” 148 However, it may be
difficult to determine if the purchase was for business or personal
purposes where prolific collectors are concerned, especially if their
primary motivation for the purchase is profit or investment.149
Auction-house sales occur through either public auction or
private sales.150 A public auction is open to anyone with resources
to purchase and may be held live in the auction salesroom or
online.151 A private sale is targeted to a select group and may be negotiated one-on-one or auctioned.152 Because private sales are generally conducted at the auction firm, these transactions are not
142

See Judith H. Dobrzynski, How Auction Houses Orchestrate Sales for Maximum
Drama, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/arts/design/
how-auction-houses-orchestrate-sales-for-maximum-drama.html
[https://perma.cc/D7MZ-VBP6].
143
See generally, e.g., Vom Lehn v. Astor Art Galleries, Ltd., 380 N.Y.S.2d 532 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1976).
144
SMITH, supra note 11, at 69.
145
Id.
146
See, e.g., Holm v. Berner, No. 06-CA-140, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 3148, ¶¶ 13–14
(Ohio Ct. App. June 29, 2007) (finding that a purchase by Berner’s Auction Gallery for
purposes of resale is not within the scope of the Ohio Home Solicitation Sales Act as it was
not for purposes that were primarily personal, family, or household use).
147
See id.
148
See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 429.0(b).
149
MARTIN WILSON, ART LAW AND THE BUSINESS OF ART 116 (2019).
150
See id. at 178; see also RALPH CASSADY, AUCTIONS AND AUCTIONEERING 8 (1967).
151
See WILSON, supra note 149, at 59–60.
152
See SMITH, supra note 11, at 15–16.
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within the scope of withdrawal rights in off-premises contracts.153
However, public auctions may be subject to withdrawal rights if the
sale was personally solicited by the auctioneer, the contract
was signed off-premises, and the purchase was intended for
personal use.154
There are several ways to bid at an auction, and the manner in
which the bidder opts to place their bid may influence whether the
contract between the auction house and the winning bidder will be
subject to withdrawal rights in off-premises contracts.155 A bid may
be offered (1) live in the auction room, (2) over the phone,
(3) online, (4) through an absentee bid,156 or (5) via an agent.157
Bidding in the auction room, via agent or directly, will not fall
under the right of withdrawal because the contract is concluded
when the hammer comes down and at that moment the buyer is on
the premises of the salesroom floor.158 Clearly, signing a contract at
the seller’s business location is not within the scope of the offpremises withdrawal right. 159 Moreover, while on its face the
atmosphere of an auction salesroom may apply pressure on
consumers to buy,160 legal intervention to protect consumers from
this type of psychological pressure would not be legitimate market
correction.161 This buyer is merely carried away by excitement—

153

Maggie Hoag, Christie’s Inc., Address at the Cardozo Art Law Society & FAME
Center Annual Symposium: From Consignment to the Auction Block (Mar. 25, 2019).
154
See supra Part I.
155
WOODHAM, supra note 11, at 98–99.
156
Bidding by absentee bid gives permission to the auction house to bid on behalf of a
client up to a specific price limit. Id. at 98–99.
157
Id. Bidding via agent can be completed over the phone, online, or live bidding in the
auction room. See id.
158
HARVEY & MEISEL, supra note 134, at 190.
159
See supra Part I.
160
HARVEY & MEISEL, supra note 134, at 11; see also CHARLES HAMILTON, AUCTION
MADNESS: AN UNCENSORED LOOK BEHIND THE VELVET DRAPES OF THE GREAT AUCTION
HOUSES 13–15 (1981) (describing “bidder’s fever” as a wave of competition that
overcomes bidders at auction and results in a purchase simply for the sake of selfaggrandizement rather than out of an earnest desire for the particular auction lot or
economically rational thought process).
161
Gerald Spindler, Internet-Auctions Versus Consumer Protection: The Case of the
Distance Selling Directive, 6 GERMAN L.J. 725, 730 (2005) (“[T] here is no room for
protecting consumers due to the psychological pressures during an auction.”).
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not contracting by mistake or under the pressure of coercive
sales tactics.162
For bidders (or agents of bidders) on the phone or online, the
contract will likely qualify as executed off-premises.163 While states
vary on whether phone or mail sales are subject to withdrawal rights,
the majority include telephone sales in their statutes.164
Absentee bidding is ambiguous as to whether it qualifies as on
or off-premises. This Note assumes that these sales take place at the
seller’s business premises, since the auction house places the bid on
behalf of their client.165 Therefore, this Note accepts that they are
not subject to rights of withdrawal.166
In sum, there are two types of off-premises contracts with
auction houses that could come under rights of withdrawal:
 A contract between the auction house and a
consignor who is purchasing for personal use,
where the auctioneer personally solicited the sale
and executed the contract at a location other than
the auctioneer’s business premises; and
 A contract between the auction house and a
winning bidder who is purchasing for personal
use, where the bid was personally solicited by the
auctioneer and placed by the bidder during a
public auction over the phone, by mail, or online
in a jurisdiction which does not provide an
exception for phone or mail sales.167

162

See id.
Arguably, online purchases, like door-to-door sales, are concluded in the home. See
Mattioli, supra note 30, at 233. In addition, courts have found that agreements made over
the phone were concluded at the consumer’s home, rather than the seller’s place of
business. See Pritzker v. Krishna Gallery of Asian Arts, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14398, at
*1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 1996); People v. Toomey, 157 Cal. App. 3d 1, 13–14 (Cal. Ct. App.
1984); Brown v. Martinelli, 419 N.E.2d 1081, 1082 (Ohio 1981).
164
See infra Appendix A.
165
WOODHAM, supra note 11, at 98–99.
166
See supra Part I.
167
Provided that no prior negotiations took place at the business premises. See, e.g., 16
C.F.R. § 429.0(a)(1) (2020).
163
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3. From Consignment to Auction Block
Auction houses invest substantial time and money in preparing
a sale. Generally, it takes an auction house three to six months after
consignment to sell a work of art.168 Yet, if the consignor or winning
bidder were to “cool off,” the auctioneer would lose the benefit of
the time and resources invested into preparing the sale because
rights of withdrawal require the seller to bear the expense of services
that have already been performed.169
The cost of auctioning an artwork accrues as soon as auction
houses specialists source and vet the work for inclusion in the
auction. 170 Specialists travel around the world to scout property,
perform scholarly research on authenticity and ownership, prepare
sales estimates, and pitch sales and marketing plans to clients in their
effort to secure a consignment. 171 In signing a consignment
agreement, the auction house commits to provide expert attribution,
restoration, and extensive marketing. 172 After consignment, but
prior to the auction, the auction house will design detailed
catalogues with original photography and significant art historical
research to promote the sale. 173 Advertising campaigns may also
include videos highlighting the work and pop-up exhibitions in
different countries. 174 Thus, marketing costs can include
168

See NOAH HOROWITZ, ART OF THE DEAL: CONTEMPORARY ART IN A GLOBAL
FINANCIAL MARKET 170 (2011).
169
See supra Part I.B.
170
WOODHAM, supra note 11, at 156.
171
See id. at 41, 89; see also Harter-Bachmann, supra note 115, at 10–11, 19, 23–24 (presale estimates rely on scholarly research regarding attribution and authenticity that may
include historical evidence, connoisseurship, scientific examination).
172
See HARVEY & MEISEL, supra note 134, at 9.
173
See WOODHAM, supra note 11, at 42.
174
See id. at 42. Importantly, during the preview period, at the pop-up exhibitions or the
auction salesroom, potential bidders have the opportunity to conduct due diligence and
become informed about the nature of the property and the consequences of the contract. Id.
at 11. For an extraordinary example of the work involved in preparing a work for sale
consider how Christie’s went above and beyond their typical marketing plan to generate
global interest for the sale of Leonardo Da Vinci’s painting, Salvator Mundi. Among other
prep work, Christie’s hired an outside marketing firm, toured the painting around the world
for exhibitions in major cities, and created a video on the painting that went viral. See, e.g.,
Eric Rhoads, The Ultimate Power of Branding: Why a Da Vinci Sold for $450.3 Million,
ART MARKETING (Nov. 27, 2017), https://artmarketing.com/2017/11/27/ultimate-powerbranding-leonardo-da-vinci-sold-450-3-million/ [https://perma.cc/Y2HV-474A].
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transportation, insurance, and photography. 175 Finally, auction
houses are also responsible for preparing and curating salesrooms
and exhibition spaces.176
If the right of withdrawal were applied to art auctions,
auctioneers would be forced to absorb all of these costs in the event
of a cancelled sale. 177 However, auction houses are, after all, a
conduit between consignors and bidders, and it would therefore be
reasonable for auctioneers to spread these sunk costs to
consumers.178 For example, auction houses could recoup the costs
of administering returns by increasing their commission fees to
consignors and increasing the buyer’s premium.179 Thus, consumers
may ultimately bear the cost of their own protection.180
C. U.S. Rights of Withdrawal Could Apply to the Sale of Art at
Auction
Clearly, extension of the withdrawal right to art auctions would
profoundly affect the manner in which art is transferred.181 Thus,
this Section will examine whether there is a plausible reading of the
regulatory and statutory texts or common law that would, in fact,
apply rights of withdrawal to art auctions.
1. Read Literally, Withdrawal Rights Could Plausibly
Encompass Art Auctions
When construed literally the text of U.S. cooling-off rules
indicates auctions are within the scope of the rules. The fact that
several states created specific exceptions for auctions indicates that
these legislatures understood the rights of withdrawal to apply to
auctions. 182 Moreover, if the drafters in other states omit this
exception—particularly, when they are readily found in other,
similar laws or regulations—the strongest conclusion is that these
175

See WOODHAM, supra note 11, at 42.
See id. at 157.
177
See supra Part I.B.
178
See Rekaiti & Van den Bergh, supra note 1, at 374.
179
See id.
180
See id.
181
See supra Parts II.A., II.B.
182
See MINN. STAT. § 325G.06 Subd. 2(5) (2018); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.21(F)(6)
(LexisNexis 2018); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 423.201(1) (LexisNexis 2018).
176
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drafters intended the omission. 183 Therefore, other state statutes’
failure to exclude auctions with other enumerated exceptions 184
suggests that these legislatures intended the scope of the consumer
protection statute to cover auctions.185
The administrative history of the federal regulation also
explicitly includes auctions within the scope of the rules. In adopting
the 1995 amendments to the federal regulation, the FTC stated that
the Rule applies to public auctions, provided that the auctioneer is
directly selling goods or services to buyers.186 Arguably, art auction
houses meet this definition because they function as a conduit
between consignors and bidders such that they are direct sellers of
auctioneer services to consignors and they are direct sellers of
artwork to bidders.187
However, statutory interpretation requires that courts read rules
in a manner consistent with their intended purpose.188 Here, despite
the literal reading of withdrawal rights, the purpose of these rules
suggest they were not intended to cover art auctions. Importantly,
the primary target for door-to-door sellers are senior citizens, new
immigrants, and low-income families who are largely isolated by
economic, physical, and cultural immobility. 189 This consumer
lacks access to alternative markets for goods and services and is particularly susceptible to pressure by door-to-door sellers.190 Whereas,
the consumer advocate at auction would at most be concerned about
183

The expressio unius canon of statutory interpretation provides that the enumeration of
specific items in a statute purposely exclude items not listed. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET
AL., LEGISLATION AND REGULATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 668
(5th ed. 2014).
184
See infra Appendix A.
185
See ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 183, at 668.
186
See 1988 FTC Cooling-Off Rule Final Exemptions, supra note 76, at 45457–58 n.10,
n.23.
187
See supra Part II.B.1.
188
“[T]he reason and spirit of the law and the cause which induced the legislature to enact
it may be considered to discover its true meaning.” Gray v. Admin. Dir. of the Court, 931
P.2d 580, 590 n.15 (Haw. 1997).
189
Concurring Statement of Commissioner Julie Brill, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Federal
Trade Commission Trade Regulation Rule Concerning Cooling-Off Period for Sales Made
at Homes or at Certain Other Locations (the “Cooling-Off Rule”) (Jan. 6, 2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/617121/150106coolingoff
statement.pdf [https://perma.cc/L94F-GUCM].
190
See id.
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the bidder who is a novice art collector and is confused by the valuation of art or the consignor who is an art-world outsider trying to
access the monetary value of a deceased relative’s estate.191 Clearly,
there are fundamental differences in both the relative sophistication
of contracting parties and in the procedures by which art is sold and
how other door-to-door sales are conducted, which suggest that the
consumer is not as vulnerable in art transactions.
To begin with, although both bidders and consignors may feel
reliant on the auction house for expertise regarding the deal, they are
sophisticated parties with bargaining power against the auction
house. 192 In addition, any pressure on the consignor to sign the
contract in time for their work to be listed in an upcoming auction is
internal and not created by the demand for an immediate response
to the seller. 193 The decision to consign is not made on the
doorstep. 194 Customarily, consignors have time to conduct due
diligence, comparison shop, and negotiate these high-value
transactions. 195 Further, while auction-goers can exhibit an irrational behavior known as “bidder’s fever” that may compel a person
to bid more than they would have in a more deliberative state of
mind,196 these transactions take place on the business premises thus
are not within the scope of withdrawal rights.197 Finally, home visits
by an auction house are made at the invitation of the client, thus
there is no surprise element.198 Therefore, application of withdrawal
rights to art auctions would be contrary to the intended purpose of
these rules to protect vulnerable consumers from coercive
sales tactics.
Moreover, a common-sense reading of the text would suggest
that these cooling-off rules were not intended to cover such disparate
markets as art transactions and typical door-to-door sales. For
example, the FTC’s “Statement of Basis and Purpose” shows that
191

See Neuendorf, supra note 118.
JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN ET AL., LAW, ETHICS, AND THE VISUAL ARTS 1020 (2007).
193
See WOODHAM, supra note 11, at 114, 117 (discussing how consignors comparison
shop between different auction houses).
194
See id.
195
See id.
196
HAMILTON, supra note 160, at 13–15.
197
See infra Part II.B.2.
198
See Dobrzynski, supra note 142.
192
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the regulation was contemplated for relatively minor purchases from
unscrupulous traveling salesmen selling encyclopedia subscriptions
and vacuum cleaners in low-income areas. 199 Clearly, these
transactions differ vastly from the $45 billion global art market
where auction houses hold roughly 40% of the market share and
even “low-end” goods have significant price tags. 200 Withdrawal
rights as a remedy also presuppose that the amount in controversy
does not justify the legal expense.201 While it is true that litigation
might be impractical for minor purchases, that cannot be said for
high-value, unique transactions like art. Indeed, the value of
contracts in the art market often justify litigation.202 Thus, consumer
advocates cannot claim the same plausible application of withdrawal
rights to art auctions in comparison to typical door-to-door sales.
2. Caselaw Plausibly Suggests that Withdrawal Rights Could
Apply in Art Auctions
There are a limited number of withdrawal right cases dealing
with art and auctions from which to draw guidance.203 Perhaps this
is because withdrawal rights have not been contemplated as
applying to this market, which may change as its use becomes more
well known in Europe.204 Another reason could be that these matters
are settled outside of court, or maybe consumers are simply not
motivated to purchase based on increased consumer confidence on
the back of withdrawal rights.205

199

FTC Cooling-Off Rule Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 31, at 22936.
See RACHEL A.J. POWNALL, TEFAF ART MARKET REPORT 2017 11 (The European
Fine Art Foundation 2017).
201
Proponents of withdrawal rights argue that it is an appropriate remedy because it
provides rescission without resort to costly litigation. See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note
27, at 239; see also Brittenham, et al., supra note 30, at 1031.
202
Even a perceived loss in market value after a failed auction has acted as part of the
basis for legal proceedings. See, e.g., Cristallina S.A. v. Christie, Manson & Woods Int’l,
Inc., 502 N.Y.S.2d 165, 171 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986).
203
Notably, the majority of cases invoking the right to withdraw involve corrupt sales
practices in the home improvement industry. See infra Appendix B.
204
A 1968 U.C.L.A. empirical study of cooling-off rules suggests that consumers do not
even know about this consumer protection device, which could explain why consumers do
not invoke this right. Sánchez Abril et al., supra note 1, at 18.
205
In a 2014 study of the efficacy of cooling-off rules, 58% of sellers surveyed believed
that cooling-off periods most likely do not incentivize sales to occur that would not have
200
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The relevant cases show that courts have applied the right to
withdraw to contracts with art galleries.206 However, buyers have
yet to succeed in invoking the right against an auction house. 207
Nevertheless, looking at consumer transactions with auction houses
objectively in terms of the legal requirements for withdrawal
rights 208 a court could plausibly find these contracts subject to
cancellation as a result of the overly broad language of the coolingoff rules, as well as the fact that courts tend to disregard the unique
nature of art.209
To start with, looking at the indiscriminate terms of the
withdrawal rights, auction houses may qualify as “sellers.” 210 A
“seller” is typically defined as “any person, partnership, corporation,
or association engaged in the door-to-door sale of consumer goods
or services.” 211 Thus, the scope of the term “seller” depends
upon the meaning of “door-to-door sales” and “consumer goods
and services.”212
The auction house specialist’s home visits to clients may qualify
as “door-to-door sales” because they involve personal solicitation

otherwise happened. See Sovern, supra note 13, at 367. But see MULHOLLAND, supra note
50, at 22 (noting that impulse buys are encouraged by the right to withdraw).
206
See Pritzker v. Krishna Gallery of Asian Arts, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14398, at *1
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 1996); Vom Lehn v. Astor Art Galleries, Ltd., 380 N.Y.S.2d 532, 532
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976).
207
See Morris v. Steffes Grp., Inc., 924 N.W.2d 491, 496–97 (Iowa 2019), reh’g denied,
(Mar. 28, 2019); see generally Vaks v. Ryan, 2012 Mass. App. Div. 17 (Mass. Dist. Ct.
2012), award vacated, 2014 Mass. App. Div. 37 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 2014); Holm v. Berner,
No. 06-CA-140, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 3148 (Ohio Ct. App. June 29, 2007).
208
Statutory requirements include particular definitions for the seller, goods and services,
in addition to the requirements of minimum purchase price and personal solicitation by the
seller at a location other than the seller’s business premises. See supra Part I.B.
209
See generally Pritzker, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14398; Vom Lehn, 380 N.Y.S.2d 532.
210
As noted earlier, auction houses are direct sellers of auctioneer services to consignors
and they are direct sellers of artwork to bidders. See supra Part II.B.1. Auctioneering
services are within the scope of withdrawal rights in most jurisdictions. See infra Appendix
A. At present, aside from Minnesota, Ohio and Wisconsin, there is no general carve-out
for the auction industry. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325G.06 Subd. 2(5) (2018); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1345.21(F)(6) (LexisNexis 2018); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 423.201(1)
(LexisNexis 2018).
211
See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 429.0(c).
212
Morris, 924 N.W.2d at 496–97.
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away from the seller’s business premises. 213 For example, in
Pritzker v. Krishna Gallery of Asian Arts, Krishna Nathan
personally solicited the sale of the “Kubera,” an antique Indian
sandstone sculpture, during a visit to the buyer’s home.214 Likewise,
in Vom Lehn v. Astor Art Galleries, the buyers first discussed the
Ming Dynasty jade carvings with the seller over dinner and drinks,
and later returned to the buyer’s home where the sellers personally
solicited the sale.215
Finally, by treating art like a mere commodity courts have
overlooked its unique nature, and consequently, easily found that
artworks meet the definition of “consumer goods” under cooling-off
period rules. 216 In Krishna Gallery of Asian Arts, buyers of the
Kubera contended that the sculpture was inauthentic and sought to
cancel the sale agreement with an art gallery based on the New York
State right-of-withdrawal statute. 217 Without any discussion, the
court concluded that the Kubera was a consumer good within the
meaning of the statute.218 Similarly, in Astor Art Galleries, a buyer
invoked the same statute to cancel the sale of inauthentic Ming
Dynasty jade carvings bought from a gallery.219 The court found that
the jade carvings satisfied the definition of consumer goods as items
“primarily for personal, family or household purposes”; thus, they
were within the scope of the law.220

213

FTC Cooling-Off Rule Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 31, at 22936
(“Personal contact between the salesman and the customer in the home of the buyer is the
dominant characteristic of the door-to-door sale.”).
214
See Pritzker, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14398, at *6.
215
See Vom Lehn, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 536.
216
See generally, e.g., Pritzker, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14398; Vom Lehn, 380 N.Y.S.2d
532.
217
Pritzker, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14398, at *1 (holding summary judgement was
inappropriate due to a genuine issue of material fact regarding where the contract was
formed; plaintiff buyer argued the offer to purchase was made over the phone at their
Illinois home, defendant seller argued the offer to purchase was made at the gallery
warehouse, i.e. the seller’s business premises).
218
Id. at *6.
219
Vom Lehn, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 542 (holding plaintiff buyer could cancel the contract at
any time because the transaction met the statutory definition of door-to-door sales and
notice requirements were not adhered to by the sellers).
220
Id.
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Morris v. Steffes Group, Inc. provides more in-depth authority
on the scope of a local consumer protection statute’s definition of
“consumer goods or services” in the context of an auction, albeit not
an art auction.221 There, the Supreme Court of Iowa found that there
is no objective limitation on the terms “goods or services” other than
the buyer’s primary purpose for the purchase: “nothing in the statute
categorically declares any goods or services outside the scope of the
statute based on their inherent quality.” 222 Thus, the dispositive
question is whether the goods or services are “consumer” in
nature.223 Accordingly, as long as a consignor or winning bidder’s
purpose in buying auction services or an auction lot is “primarily for
personal, family or household purposes,” the right to withdraw will
apply.224 Taken together, these cases suggest that withdrawal rights
could apply to goods such as art and services such as auctioneering.225
However, there are strong arguments for treating art differently
than a mere consumer good or commodity. Art law professor Patty
Gerstenblith argues that art is distinguishable from ordinary
commodities in two important ways. 226 First, the value of art
fluctuates rapidly because it is governed by the particularities of the
art trade. 227 For example, there are practical consequences to an
artwork’s value that flow from a cancelled sale: its devaluation.228
Second, art is unique, much like real estate, 229 and real estate is
generally exempt from withdrawal rights.230
221

Morris v. Steffes Grp., Inc., 924 N.W.2d 491, 496–97 (Iowa 2019) (holding that the
state consumer protection statute may cover the auction of a tractor if the buyer’s purpose
was “primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.”).
222
Id. at 499. Moreover, this broad definition of “consumer goods and services” shows
an intent to exclude only those transactions motivated by business purposes based on the
assumption that those transactions involve less vulnerable parties, who do not need the
safeguards of consumer protection law. Id. at 500.
223
See id.
224
See id. at 501.
225
See id.
226
See GERSTENBLITH, supra note 119, at 339.
227
See id.
228
See generally BI Report, supra note 2.
229
See GERSTENBLITH, supra note 119, at 339.
230
See, e.g., FTC Cooling-Off Rule Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 31, at
22948 (real estate sales “would not fall within the scope of the definition of consumer
goods or services.”). However, the federal rule and seventeen states also explicitly exclude
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In addition, the case law further supports the argument that art
should be exempt from withdrawal rights. In particular, both
Krishna Gallery of Asian Arts and Astor Art Galleries illustrate that
there already appear to be protections in place for consumers in
the art market that address the underlying purposes of withdrawal
rights. 231 Notably, in both of these cases the determining factor
was the seller’s misrepresentation of the authenticity of the
goods.232 Therefore, both matters could have simply been resolved
with the application of New York’s specific art market
legislation, 233 or under claims such as breach of warranty or
fraudulent misrepresentation.234
Furthermore, the art market involves repeat transactions with
sophisticated parties, which contrasts sharply with the more
vulnerable consumers whom withdrawal rights were intended to
protect. 235 In Krishna Gallery of Asian Arts, the buyer was the
leading collector of Asian art, as well as one of the wealthiest Americans at the time.236 He was able to hire the senior curator of Asian
Art at the Los Angeles County Museum of Art as a consultant.237
The court in Vaks v. Ryan suggested that withdrawal rights are not
intended to protect such sophisticated buyers operating in the top
transactions related to real property. See infra Appendix A. There may have been an
intention to exclude real estate sales from the FTC Rule and other state withdrawal rights
because the consumer is already protected by the customary process of these transactions
which involve a closing period that operates very similarly to a cooling-off period.
Similarly, in art transactions, art market specific legislation already fills the gap that
withdrawal rights are intended to remedy. See infra Part IV.A. Like the right of withdrawal,
art market specific legislation only applies when the seller is an art merchant and the buyer
is not as sophisticated, as the purpose for these laws is “to protect unknowing buyers from
knowing sellers who may try to use the unequal balance of information power to their own
advantage.” Christie’s Inc. v. SWCA, Inc., 867 N.Y.S.2d 650, 656 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008).
231
See, e.g., Pritzker v. Krishna Gallery of Asian Arts, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14398, at
*1 (holding that both New York’s Door-to-Door Sales Act and New York’s specific art
market legislation could be applied).
232
See generally Pritzker, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *1; Vom Lehn v. Astor Art
Galleries, Ltd., 380 N.Y.S.2d 532, 532 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976).
233
GERSTENBLITH, supra note 119, at 405.
234
See, e.g., Rogath v. Siebenmann, 129 F.3d 261, 262 (2d Cir. 1997) (plaintiff-buyer of
allegedly inauthentic Francis Bacon painting brings claims of breach of warranty and fraud
against seller).
235
See supra Part II.C.1.
236
GERSTENBLITH, supra note 119, at 404.
237
Id.
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price brackets of the art trade. 238 There, a sophisticated buyer
controlled the lengthy negotiation process, which provided the
buyer ample time for reflection upon the transaction.239 The court
held that the consignor was not entitled to protection under the
Massachusetts right of withdrawal because the statute was intended
to protect “unwary consumers from unwelcome solicitors.”240 This
holding implies that providing sophisticated parties free
withdrawal is an ineffective use of consumer protection law.241

238
See Vaks v. Ryan, 2012 Mass. App. Div. 17, 17 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 2012). In Vaks, the
consignors contacted about five auction houses over the course of a month to discuss
conditions of sale for home furnishings. Id. at 17. Ultimately, Rimma Vaks consigned to
Ryan Auction Company over 150 lots, including furniture, paintings, and rugs. Id. As the
consignments were sold during the ensuing months, a dispute as to the commission
percentage arose. Id. at 18. The dispute culminated in a complaint by Vaks about the
manner in which the auction was conducted, which relied in part on a claim under the
Massachusetts State right of withdrawal. Id. While, the court in Vaks expressed sympathy
towards evaluating claims against the legislative purpose of protecting more vulnerable
consumers, this argument discriminates between the relative sophistication of buyers in a
way that may not hold up in another court. In Burke v. Yingling, for example, the
Pennsylvania Superior Court explicitly overturned a previous ruling which reasoned that a
sophisticated buyer who initiated contact with the seller and conducted lengthy
negotiations over the purchase of an expensive product was not the type of consumer that
the state’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law was meant to protect. See
Burke v. Yingling, 666 A.2d 288, 290–91 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (reversing a grant of
summary judgement in favor of appellee seller, as the appellant buyer of an audio-visual
system was entitled to protection under the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and
Consumer Protection Law). In doing so the court emphasized that the statutory language
provides a “right to cancel to all buyers even if the buyer is sophisticated, in no way
deceived or pressured by the Seller, and takes adequate time to reflect before agreeing to
the transaction.” Id. at 22 (emphasis added). Thus, the court declined to differentiate
between buyers “deserving” of protection, and those not. Id. at 22. However, in a more
recent decision specific to the art market, the court held as a matter of law that buyers in
the top price brackets cannot rely on “information asymmetry” in claims against art
merchants hard-selling work: “these sophisticated plaintiffs cannot demonstrate reasonable
reliance because they conducted no due diligence.” MAFG Art Fund, LLC v. Gagosian,
123 A.D.3d 458, 459 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014) (dismissing claims against the Gagosian
Gallery for withholding information and selling artwork at an inflated price). Accordingly,
although there is some uncertainty, a policy argument might prevail in court today. See id.
239
See Vaks, 2012 Mass. App. Div. at 22.
240
Id. The court also noted that the fact that the buyer had initiated contact with the seller
factored into the decision. Id. Whereas some states provide that buyer-initiated sales are
exempt from withdrawal rights; the Massachusetts statute does not do so. See MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 93, § 48 (2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 255D, § 9 (2018).
241
See, e.g., Vaks, 2012 Mass. App. Div. at 17.
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Lastly, the remedies attached to withdrawal rights permit
dissatisfied consumers to receive services in full at no cost or return
goods without covering depreciation costs. 242 While these rights
were not intended to be a “satisfaction guarantee,”243 consumers will
attempt to use the right of withdrawal as such.244 For example, in
Holm v. Berner the dispute arose specifically because the plaintiff
was not satisfied with his compensation for property sold through
an auction gallery.245 Duane Holm sold collectibles, furniture, and
other personal property to Berner’s Auction Gallery but when he
learned that the gallery had resold the items for considerably higher
value, he brought suit.246 The Court of Appeals of Ohio found that
the withdrawal right did not apply because Holm sold his property
outright to Berner’s Auction Gallery; thus Holm was the seller and
Berner was the buyer.247 Baring this technicality, the outcome could
have permitted rescission of the contract and would have transformed the right of withdrawal into a satisfaction-guarantee right.
III. RIGHTS OF WITHDRAWAL UNDERMINE THE SALE OF ART AT
AUCTION
In his critique on the E.U. right of withdrawal, Pierre Valentin
argued that the right to cancel is irreconcilable with the auction of
art for three reasons.248 First, a cancelled sale reduces the market
value of art.249 Second, consumers who can easily avoid a contract
become more risk-friendly and bid speculatively, which drives

242

See supra Part I.B.
See, e.g., 1995 FTC Cooling-Off Rule Non-Substantive Amendments, supra note 50,
at 54184 (“The Cooling-Off Rule was not intended to be a federal “satisfaction guarantee”
requirement or “buyers’ remorse” insurance program.”).
244
See generally Holm v. Berner, No. 06-CA-140, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 3148 (Ohio
Ct. App. June 29, 2007).
245
Id. at ¶¶ 1–3.
246
Id.
247
Id. at ¶¶ 23–24. Withdrawal rights are intended to protect the buyer, not the seller,
thus sellers cannot invoke this right. Id. at ¶ 24. Moreover, the court found that even if
Berner was the buyer, the goods were purchased for resale, which does not qualify as
personal use, thus the transaction would still be excluded from the scope of the statute. Id.
248
See Valentin, supra note 7.
249
Id.
243
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prices up and distorts published market prices.250 Third, if a buyer
were to exercise the right to cancel, costs of the artwork’s
depreciation and the sale preparation would revert to the seller and,
by extension, back to consumers.251 Valentin’s critique of the E.U.
right of withdrawal is equally applicable in the United States, as
consumers and auctioneers face the same challenges under the
federal and state rights of withdrawal in off-premises contracts.
This Part will expand on these arguments in more depth as
applied to the U.S. rights of withdrawal by arguing that the
indiscriminate application of these rights to art auction sales would
be inefficient and harmful. Consumer protection law should respond
to the challenges of the specific market affected and strive to find a
balance between consumer and market interests. 252 Therefore,
courts, regulators, and legislatures should consider the peculiarities
of the art market before applying the right to cancel to art auctions.
A. Repercussions of a Cancelled Sale on the Value of the Artwork
The right to cancel is too costly to implement in this market
because a cancelled sale will reduce an artwork’s market value
significantly. 253 While free withdrawal might work well for the
minor purchases of mass-produced goods contemplated by the
drafters, 254 it fails when it comes to art, which exists in its own
“economic microcosm.”255 “[I]n the arcane world of high-priced art,
market value is affected by market perceptions,”256 and the art world
considers artwork devalued—“burnt”—as a result of its failure to
sell.257 In fact, the general assumption is that a burnt work of art has
failed to sell because it is of “poor quality, bad condition or dubious

250

Id.
Id.
252
See Bar-Gill, supra note 29, at 801–02.
253
Cooling-off periods may be “too costly to implement—for example, when using a
purchased good during the cooling-off period causes significant depreciation in the value
of the good.” Camerer et al., supra note 27, at 1240.
254
See FTC Cooling-Off Rule Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 31, at 22936.
255
See Higgins, supra note 115, at 227–28.
256
Firestone & Parson, Inc. v. Union League of Phila., 672 F. Supp. 819, 823 (E.D. Pa.
1987).
257
See generally BI Report, supra note 2.
251
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provenance.”258 Those works that may be pulled prior to auction are
also assumed to have uncertain ownership or authenticity.259 As a
result, the unsold work has lost its initial appeal to buyers.260
At auction, a cancelled sale will cause long-term material harm
to a one-of-a-kind item’s value.261 Studies show that the average
price of art decreases by 27–33% when it appears at auction for a
second time.262 Statistics also show that it takes about six years for
the market value of the burnt artwork to return to status quo ante the
failed sale.263 In addition, consignors generally must withdraw the
burnt work from the market for at least a year to create demand for
it,264 but the average holding period is closer to eight years.265 Given
that auctions regularly set record prices these depreciation costs are
significant—losses could be in the range of hundreds of thousands,
if not millions, of dollars.266
By extension, a cancelled sale may also negatively impact
the market for the artist’s entire category of work, as well as work
by others in the same style. 267 As an example of how the sales
history for one of an artist’s pieces can impact the market for the rest
258

Id. at 1.
See Isaac Kaplan, Why Are Artworks Pulled from Auction?, ARTSY (July 13, 2017),
https://www.artsy.net/article/artsy-editorial-artworks-pulled-auction
[https://perma.cc/H2L4-UDUC].
260
See SMITH, supra note 11, at 39.
261
See generally BI Report, supra note 2 (noting an average decrease in value of 27%);
see also Beggs & Graddy, supra note 126, at 28 (noting that devaluation varies enormously
from an average decrease of 33% to as much as 55% seen in certain cases).
262
See BI Report, supra note 2, at 2. In addition to the reduced market value of the auction
lot, the auctioneer must also lower its commission to encourage bids. Id.
263
See id.
264
MERRYMAN, supra note 192, at 965.
265
Beggs & Graddy, supra note 126, at 13 (noting that the average holding period for
failed sale is 7.65 years).
266
For example, if the sale of the Salvator Mundi had been cancelled, on reoffer the
painting’s final sale price might have decreased by as much as $121.5 million, 27% of the
over $450 million sale price. See, e.g., Leonardo’s Salvator Mundi Makes Auction History,
CHRISTIE’S (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.christies.com/features/Leonardo-and-Post-Warresults-New-York-8729-3.aspx [https://perma.cc/G6NB-XPTU] (describing the historic
sale of a recently discovered Leonardo Da Vinci painting, the Salvator Mundi, for
$450,312,500).
267
SMITH, supra note 11, at 3 (noting that the auction of Van Gogh’s Irises for over $50
million not only set the price for that particular work, but also affected the price of all of
Van Gogh’s work and all Post-Impressionist paintings).
259
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of their works, Christopher Wool’s And If You (1992) sold for $13.6
million at Christie’s in 2016, a 40% drop in price when compared
to the artist’s almost-perfect substitute If You (1992), which sold
for $23.7 million in 2014.268 The day after the sale of the And If
You (1992), the artist’s other word painting Untitled (1990) sold
at Sotheby’s for a very similar price, $13.9 million.269 Given this
ripple effect, depreciation costs can be significant and often difficult
to calculate.270
Even advocates for the right of withdrawal as a default rule
admit that transactions involving goods whose value changes
dramatically should not be included within the scope of the right, as
withdrawal would defeat the purpose of these contracts. 271 Omri
Ben-Shahar and Eric Posner proposed an optimal contract model
based in economic efficiency, which supports free withdrawal as a
default rule where goods depreciate slowly, but opposes it where the
value of the goods rapidly depreciates, depreciation is difficult to
measure, and where the value fluctuates rapidly, such as at
auctions.272 These scholars emphasized that the value of goods sold
at auction are volatile; thus, auctions are a prime example of
transactions that should be exempt from withdrawal rights. 273
Further, cost-benefit analysis suggests that rights of withdrawal may
not be justified in markets where the contract cannot be easily
reversed.274 Because it is so difficult to unwind the contract for the
winning bidder at auction, it follows that auctions are a poor fit for
the application of the withdrawal right.275

268

WOODHAM, supra note 11, at 74–75.
Id.
270
See SMITH, supra note 11, at 3.
271
See Ben-Shahar & Posner, supra note 16, at 138.
272
See id. at 138, 144. The authors also oppose the application of the right to business
sales where the contracting parties are sophisticated. Id. at 145–46.
273
See id. at 138.
274
See Jeffrey L. Harrison, Happiness, Efficiency, and the Promise of Decisional Equity:
From Outcome to Process, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 935, 987–88 (2009).
275
See id.
269
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B. Moral Hazard and Artificially Distorted Auction Prices
The right to withdraw can trigger opportunistic behavior276 and
welfare-reducing purchase decisions.277 In particular, the ability to
deliberate on purchases ex post contracting during a cooling-off
period creates an incentive for impulse buys.278 Economists describe
this phenomenon as buyer’s opportunism, or “moral hazard.” 279
Moral hazard is when it becomes more probable that the buyer will
behave in a morally reprehensible way because the consequences of
the buyer’s decisions are borne by others.280 Since such opportunism
harms contracting parties, moral hazard is one of the most
significant arguments against the right to withdraw.281
Given that consumers are facing significant high-value
transactions at auctions,282 they should have an incentive to learn
about their purchases and seek expert advice ex ante.283 As John
Henry Merryman, a founder of the field of art law, put it: “[t]he
prudent collector who loves art and wants to enjoy collecting
without making unnecessary mistakes will find that much time and
research may be required.” 284 The concern is that, if the right to
withdraw applies, consumers are protected from bearing the risks of
a cancelled sale and therefore may choose to avoid due diligence
costs prior to the sale. It is illogical to apply withdrawal rights in
such a way. Rather than helping vulnerable consumers avoid a
coercive door-to-door sale, using the withdrawal right in the art

276

See Rekaiti & Van den Bergh, supra note 1, at 381.
MULHOLLAND, supra note 50, at 22.
278
Id.
279
The term “moral hazard” finds its roots in insurance literature, which first discussed
information problems like the moral hazard that inevitably arises when an insurance
company cannot observe whether the insured exerts effort to prevent an accident and the
“adverse selection” that occurs when the insured knows more than the insurer about the
individual’s likelihood of an accident. ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC
THEORY 477 n.1 (1995). However, there are a broad range of economic relationships that
fit into this general framework of principal-agent problems, including auctions.
280
See PATRICK BOLTON & MATHIAS DEWATRIPONT, CONTRACT THEORY 20 (2005)
(“When a person gets better protection against a bad outcome, she will rationally invest
fewer resources in trying to avoid it.”).
281
MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 279, at 478.
282
See POWNALL, supra note 200, at 11.
283
Bar-Gill, supra note 29, at 758.
284
MERRYMAN, supra note 192, at 965.
277
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auction context, ostensibly to allow sophisticated art collectors an
unfair advantage and to rid them of the expensive and timeconsuming responsibility of due diligence, only accommodates
regret; namely, “buyer’s remorse” and “seller’s remorse.”
1. Effects on Bidders: Buyer’s Remorse
Trading at auction depends on the finality of the resulting
contracts, which withdrawal rights undermine and leave open to the
opportunity of abuse.285 Gerald Spindler has warned that “[i]f buyers are enabled to revoke their contracts after the end of an auction
there would be no risk for a buyer in making the highest possible
bid, thus rendering the auction a farce.”286 This risk neutrality provides an incentive for the bidder to rescind as a dominant strategy
and to bid speculatively.287
Without free withdrawal, the bidder must put in effort to learn
about the item on which they bid.288 Auction houses offer services
to bidders to overcome this information asymmetry: bidders have
the opportunity to learn about the auction lot during the preview
period by visiting the auction gallery or consulting with
specialists;289 yet this costs the bidder time, energy, and money.290
Critically the consumer is not required to justify why they seek to
withdraw; therefore, winning bidders could save on their normal
information costs by choosing to wait and learn about the artwork
during the cooling-off period, and, if necessary, return it
with buyer’s remorse. 291 In this way, the right to cancel can

285

See Spindler, supra note 161, at 725.
Id.
287
Id.
288
See BOLTON & DEWATRIPONT, supra note 280, at 129.
289
WOODHAM, supra note 11, at 11–12.
290
See BOLTON & DEWATRIPONT, supra note 280, at 129.
291
“Often, parties waive the banner of freedom from contract deviously, to masquerade
what is otherwise plain opportunistic regret. Something changed—prices went up, new
bidders came by, the deal doesn’t look so good after all—such that a retracting party may
seek to recapture an opportunity he gave up previously, when making a promise. Thus, for
example, a party who made a firm offer in the hope of attracting attention from the offeree
may seek to revoke it when a better deal was proposed by a third party.” Omri Ben-Shahar,
Freedom From Contract, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 261, 269.
286
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encourage irresponsible bidding and increase the number of
uninformed purchases.292
Speculative bidding also makes it more likely that the individual
who values the auctioned item most will not obtain it.293 In auctions,
allocative efficiency is achieved when the individual who values the
auction lot the most wins.294 Yet, if the winner postpones learning
about the purchase ex ante, they will have less information about the
item’s worth than the seller or even other bidders, and is more likely
to be disappointed by the sale.295 By facilitating this inefficiency at
auction, the right to withdraw will harm all consumers involved in
art auctions.296
Additionally, the perceived interest of the bidders and the
potential for competition at auction may create a false sense of
demand for the work, which harms consumers by raising prices.297
The art market is more vulnerable to manipulation than other
markets, due to limited supply and demand.298 An auction house’s
estimate of the selling price of the lot, and therefore its reserve or
minimum selling price, 299 is based on, among other things, estimated market conditions.300 House specialists who set the estimate
may publish inflated prices due to the false enthusiasm of bidders
who do not intend to follow through with the sale.301 This inflated
demand creates a market distortion where the sale price no longer
292

See Spindler, supra note 161, at 725.
See BOLTON & DEWATRIPONT, supra note 280, at 129.
294
See id. at 262.
295
See id. at 26 (discussing “winner’s curse”).
296
See id. at 243.
297
See SMITH, supra note 11, at 30.
298
See id.
299
See Andrew M. Goldstein, A Beginner’s Guide to Art Auctions, ARTSPACE (Nov. 8,
2012),
https://www.artspace.com/magazine/art_101/art_market/art_101_a_guide_to_
auction_lingo-5558 [https://perma.cc/5KRY-2FBF].
300
Michael McCullough, Successu Ex Machina. Making Sense of Auction Estimates,
GALLERY INTELL, http://www.galleryintell.com/successu-ex-machina-making-sense-ofauction-estimates/ [https://perma.cc/AWH8-DSLB].
301
See WOODHAM, supra note 11, at 100 (“So if specialists know the interest is strong
[because multiple bidders have registered] . . . they are more likely to recommend the
seller set a higher reserve right for the object”); see also Sánchez Abril et al., supra note 1,
at 6 n.7 (cooling-off period “legislation would invite bad-faith contracts, that is to say,
orders signed by a purchaser with the full intention of canceling the order the next
day . . . .”) (citation omitted).
293
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reflects the artwork’s true market value. 302 Thus, even in
instances where the right to withdraw is not invoked, it could cause
price inflation that results in consumers overpaying.303
2. Effects on Consignors: Seller’s Remorse
In like manner, the withdrawal right provides consignors with
an improper incentive to rescind. The consignor exercising the right
may receive a windfall if they get to both freely exit the contract and
obtain the same payoff as though the bargain had been fully
performed.304 For example, if the consignor were to walk away from
an auction house after free appraisals and restoration have been done
in preparation of the sale, then the consignor could use these services
as a bargaining chip to sell the property with a competitor under a
more favorable contract.305
Further, it is feasible for consignors to exploit the right to
withdraw in instances where they consider their consignment as
having been sold at an undervalued purchase price. Several cases
show consignors attempting to take advantage of the right when
dissatisfied. 306 For example, in both Vaks v. Ryan and Holm v.
Berner, the primary motivation for the plaintiffs to rescind their
contracts with the auction houses appeared to be disappointment
over the selling price of their property. 307 Notably, neither case
included arguments that the plaintiffs felt pressured to consent to
the contract.308
Thus, rights of withdrawal may offer consignors yet another way
of asking the court to permit them to back out of unfavorable
agreements. However, the withdrawal rights were not written with
302

Valentin, supra note 7.
Id.
304
See supra Part I.B.
305
See Daniel Grant, Cost of Consigning Artwork? Don’t Forget, Most Fees Are
Negotiable, OBSERVER (Feb. 12, 2016), https://observer.com/2016/02/cost-of-consigningartwork-dont-forget-most-fees-are-negotiable/ [https://perma.cc/PCX2-9B9E]. See also
supra Part II.B.2.
306
See, e.g., Vaks v. Ryan, 2012 Mass. App. Div. 17, 17–18 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 2012); Holm
v. Berner, No. 06-CA-140, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 3148 (Ohio Ct. App. June 29, 2007).
307
See Vaks, 2012 Mass. App. Div. at 17–18; Holm, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 3440, ¶¶ 1–
3.
308
See generally Vaks, 2012 Mass. App. Div. 17; Holm, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 3440.
303
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the purpose of allowing dissatisfied customers to receive a full
refund after services have been performed; this is not a satisfactionguarantee right.309
Moreover, there are already protections in place that suggest
withdrawal rights may not be necessary in the context of the contract
with the consignor. 310 The competition between auction houses
serves the interests of consignors.311 Auction houses compete with
each other to offer the most favorable contract terms in order to
obtain the consignment of top artwork for sale.312 The consignor is
free to compare sales proposals, marketing plans, auction estimates,
and reserve prices as they shop around for auction services. 313
Consignors often negotiate over high-value artwork with auction
houses right up until the moment that the catalogues go to print.314
Further, the consignment agreement itself includes terms intended
to protect consignors, including reserve prices,315 guarantees,316 and
implied fiduciary duties.317

309

See, e.g., 1995 FTC Cooling-Off Rule Non-Substantive Amendments, supra note 50,
at 54184.
310
See WOODHAM, supra note 11, at 114, 117
311
See id.; see also HARVEY & MEISEL, supra note 134, at 9 (discussing the importance
of competition in this market).
312
WILSON, supra 149, at 47.
313
See WOODHAM, supra note 11, at 114, 117.
314
See Isaac Kaplan, 5 Questions to Ask an Auction House before Consigning a Work,
ARTSY (July 31, 2017 5:03 PM), https://www.artsy.net/article/artsy-editorial-5-questionsauction-house-consigning-work (discussing that the deadline to submit a work to auction
is between 6 weeks to 3 months depending on the preliminary work the auction house must
complete prior to the sale, including publishing an auction catalogue).
315
A reserve is the minimum price at which a consignor agrees to sell a property. SMITH,
supra note 11, at 140 (“[T]he selling party tends to be in the more dominant position in an
art auction. This position of strength is greatly augmented by the fact that the auctioneer
will generally protect the seller by setting a reserve price.”).
316
Guarantee deals protect consignors by “guaranteeing” their consignment will sell for
a good price. WOODHAM, supra note 11, at 158. With a guarantee, the auction house makes
a promise to pay the consignor a minimum price no matter the results at auction, including
if the property fails to sell. Id. at 160. Guarantees are like an insurance policy from the
auction house. Id.
317
Harter-Bachmann, supra note 115, at 11 (“Because the auction house is the seller’s
agent, they offer their expertise and act as an intermediary between the seller and the buyer,
balancing the information asymmetry between [consignors] and [winning bidders].”).
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C. Unreasonable Sunk Costs of Preparing an Artwork for Sale at
Auction
The economic ramifications of extending the right to withdraw
to art auctions include the dramatic decrease in the market value of
the artwork and the substantial sunk costs of preparing the
auction. 318 Who will bear the costs of administering returns of
unwanted artwork? Under the rules, the seller, i.e., auction houses,
must absorb these losses.319 However, it is likely that the costs will
ultimately be transferred to the consumer, which would defeat the
withdrawal rights’ objective of consumer protection.320
If a successful bidder were able to freely withdraw at auction,
both consumers and the auction house would suffer. Importantly, it
is not guaranteed that the same concentration of interested
purchasers would bid a second time, and the auctioneer will have
lost the opportunity to maximize the sale price of the work for the
consignor.321 Additionally, the auction house will have to internalize the extensive cost of preparing the sale.322 Furthermore, in order
to mitigate costs associated with cancellation, auction houses may
opt to reduce the choice of items for sale or increase the vetting process for bidders.323 This reduction of choice introduces one more
inefficiency into this market—now ostensibly less artworks will
be auctioned and when auctions do occur, the pieces will be
more expensive.324
If a consignor were able to withdraw after the auction, similar
repercussions would materialize for the bidder and auctioneer.
When no notice of the withdrawal right is provided, the rules permit
a consignor to return a year or more after the auction took place to
cancel the contract.325 As a result, the auctioneer would be in the
318

See supra Parts II.B.3; III.A.
See supra Part I.B.
320
See Rekaiti & Van den Bergh, supra note 1, at 373.
321
See Harter-Bachmann, supra note 115, at 7.
322
See supra Part II.B.3.
323
See Rekaiti & Van den Bergh, supra note 1, at 383–84 (discussing the harm to
consumer that may result from reduced choice).
324
See id.
325
In fact, cooling-off periods typically extend indefinitely if the auctioneer concludes
that it is not subject to the right of withdrawal and thus fails to provide the consignor both
written and verbal notice of the right to cancel. See, e.g., Knight v. Colazzo, No. 24110,
319
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awkward position of either (1) unwinding the sale to return both the
consignor and the winning bidder to their positions prior to the sale,
(2) refunding the consignor while the winning bidder keeps the
goods, or (3) buying back a lot from the winning bidder that was
already sold, and which may no longer be commercially viable.326
Thus, the auctioneer would absorb the lost opportunity costs of the
auction, sunk costs of preparing the sale, and the depreciation costs
of the artwork. Ultimately, an auction house may respond to these
costs by raising prices, reducing their goods and services, or
delaying performance, all of which will harm consumers.327
Even if notice requirements are met and the cooling-off period
is limited to three days, the auctioneer still suffers reliance costs
should the consignor “cool off” prior to the auction. By the time the
consignment agreement is signed, the auction house has already
invested significantly in preparing the sale by vetting the work,
pitching marketing proposals, and potentially even shipping the
artwork to the salesroom. 328 Yet, free withdrawal means that the
seller is not compensated for services already performed.329
Proponents of the right to withdraw may argue that to mitigate
expenses with regard to the consignor, the auction house could
simply provide notice of the right and delay performance until the
cooling-off period expires. However, the extended negotiations over
the consignment contract often run until the moment the auction
catalogue is published. 330 If the sale has already been publicized
when the consignor withdraws, the auction house risks reputational
harm and lost profits from the embarrassment of losing a

2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 5521, at **12 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008) (holding a buyer may
withdraw from a contract almost six years after services were performed). For a list of
states that extend cooling-off periods for lack of notice see infra Appendix A.
326
Depending on when the auction took place, it may be unreasonable to ask the winning
bidder, a good faith purchaser, to return the item that they purchased. Valentin, supra note
7.
327
See Rekaiti & Van den Bergh, supra note 1, at 383–84.
328
See supra Part II.B.3.
329
See supra Part I.
330
Even if the auction is months away, the publication deadline for the catalogue may be
within the cooling-off period. See Kaplan, supra note 314 (discussing deadlines for
accepting a work to auction). On the other hand, if the sale is not yet public, it may be
easier and less costly for the seller when the consignors cool-off.
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consignment.331 As one art dealer put it: “The auctions’ publicity
power works against them . . . .[i]f pieces don’t sell, everybody
knows it right away and they start to worry about the market.”332
In fact, the auction house’s very ability to conduct business is put
in question.333
Further, if the work has been damaged during the cooling-off
period, the law is silent on whether the auctioneer may claim
restitution for this depreciation in value.334 Buyers who can easily
return products have weakened incentives to handle them carefully
while they hold them.335 However, the free withdrawal policy means
that consumers are not generally obligated to pay for depreciation.336
In light of the substantial costs of administering “returns” in the
context of an art auction, the seller’s reliance costs should
be considered.337
In addition, the increased transaction costs in creating custom
contracts that comply with notice requirements may result in further
harm to consumers. Currently, most contracts with auction houses
contain standard terms.338 Typically, consignment agreements are
the only documents negotiated. 339 Even these agreements will

331

See HARVEY & MEISEL, supra note 134, at 9 (discussing competition amongst auction
houses).
332
Russell Shor, Spring 2019 Auctions: Premium Prices for Historic Pieces, GIA (Jun.
14, 2019), https://www.gia.edu/gia-news-research/spring-2019-auctions-premium-priceshistoric-pieces.
333
MERRYMAN, supra note 192, at 1012.
334
See Valentin, supra note 7.
335
See Ben-Shahar & Posner, supra note 16, at 145.
336
See supra Part I.
337
See Rekaiti & Van den Bergh, supra note 1, at 376 (discussing detrimental reliance);
Ben-Shahar, supra note 291, at 269.
338
See Grant, supra note 305 (noting that few auction house clients want to negotiate—
they would rather have fun and revel in their passion for art or collecting).
339
Generally, terms that are amended include (1) complex financial arrangements
(reserves, guarantees, etc.), (2) withdrawal, (3) warranties, (4) termination, and (5)
insurance. See Grant, supra note 305 (discussing a few terms that may be negotiated in
standard consignment agreements such as insurance); for a discussion on guarantees see
WOODHAM, supra note 11, at 41–43; for a discussion on reserves see Rita Reif, Auctions,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 1985) https://www.nytimes.com/1985/08/02/arts/auctions.html
[https://perma.cc/VA2J-5QFL]. Typically, withdrawal, in this context is understood as
removal of a lot from auction, which usually occurs as a result of misattribution, or other
doubts regarding ownership or authenticity. See Kaplan, supra note 259.
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generally only be amended for highly coveted consignments where
the auction houses are competing for the same sale.340 Considering
the patchwork of state withdrawal rights, the different treatment of
personal and business purchases, and the fact that even the major
auction houses only provide for a small number of in-house
attorneys, compliance with the rigorous notice requirements for
withdrawal rights may be costly.341 These costs may be reasonably
assumed to trickle down to consumers or even prompt auctioneers
to leave the market. 342 Because consumers would likely bear the
cost of their protection through higher prices, the redistributive goals
of free withdrawal may not be achieved.343
IV. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM OF U.S. RIGHTS OF WITHDRAWAL
From a consumer protection perspective, applying rights of
withdrawal to art auctions is ineffective. Reform of the U.S. rights
of withdrawal could solve this problem easily. In the past, Public
Auto Auction petitioned the FTC for an exception to the CoolingOff Rule, which prompted the Commission to categorically exempt
auto auctions.344 In like manner, auction houses could petition the
FTC for an exception for art auctions or an even broader exception
for the sale of art.345
As an alternative to such an industry-wide exception,
amendments to the Cooling-Off Rule could reduce the incentives to

340

See, e.g., WOODHAM, supra note 11, at 41–43 (discussing that one of the largest
guarantees in auction history was offered by Sotheby’s to secure for consignment the sale
of Alfred Taubmen’s collection, which was highly coveted by their direct competitor
Christie’s).
341
Cardozo Law School’s Art Law Society organized a symposium that included inhouse counsel at the world’s four major auction houses as speakers, namely Rebecca
VanZandt of Phillips, Maggie Hoag of Christie’s, Patricia Pernes of Bonham’s, and Aimee
Scilieri of Sotheby’s, who shared that the New York offices of these auction houses only
include one to twelve in-house attorneys respectively. Cardozo Art Law Society & FAME
Center Annual Symposium: From Consignment to the Auction Block (Mar. 25, 2019).
342
Rekaiti & Van den Bergh, supra note 1, at 383, 395.
343
Id. at 374.
344
See 16 C.F.R. § 429.3(a).
345
Under Section 18(g)(1) of FTCA “[a]ny person to whom a rule under subsection
(a)(1)(B) of this section applies may petition the Commission for an exemption from such
rule.” See 1987 FTC Cooling-Off Rule Proposed Exemptions, supra note 76, at 29541.
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misuse the right of withdrawal.346 The risk of buyer’s opportunism
could be addressed by amendments that require the buyer to cover
the depreciation cost to the seller347 or cap the maximum purchase
price of transactions that would be subject to the Rule.
If granted, such amendments would hopefully prompt similar
reform among the states. Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin have
already created an explicit carve-out for auctions.348 On the other
hand, should the Commission decline to amend the regulation, at
least there would be certainty regarding the application of the Rule
and auctioneers could adjust their business practices accordingly.
A. Creating an Exemption for Art Auction Houses or the Sale
of Art
The ideal, most ambitious proposal for reform would provide a
straightforward exception for art auctions. The FTC is likely to grant
this exception because it is justified by the same reasoning the
Commission used when it adopted an exception for auto auctions.
In particular, the FTC found that auto auctions do not have the unfair
practices which the Cooling-Off Rule was intended to remedy
because consumers who intentionally attend an auction can easily
escape the sales pitch.349 Likewise, cooling-off periods do not serve
their intended purpose at art auctions because these transactions do
not involve the same coercive sales techniques as seen in doorstep
sales.350
Additionally, this amendment would recognize that auction
houses are regulated industries under fiduciary law. 351 Fiduciary
obligations are the “highest standard of conduct” under the law.352
Auctioneers have legal responsibilities to consignors to take care of
the goods in their possession and maximize profits from sales, and,
to a lesser degree, they also owe a duty to winning bidders to

346

BOLTON & DEWATRIPONT, supra note 280, at 169; Spindler, supra note 161, at 732.
See Ben-Shahar & Posner, supra note 16, at 122; Bar-Gill, supra note 29, at 790.
348
See MINN. STAT. § 325G.06(5) (2018); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.21(F)(6)
(LexisNexis 2018); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 423.201(1) (LexisNexis 2018).
349
See 1988 FTC Cooling-Off Rule Final Exemptions, supra note 76, at 45458 n.23.
350
See supra Part II.
351
See Harter-Bachmann, supra note 115, at 11, 44.
352
GERSTENBLITH, supra note 119, at 299.
347
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describe the goods accurately. 353 The California consumer
protection statute bars consumers from enforcing withdrawal rights
against certain types of “regulated professions,” including
physicians, attorneys, and real estate brokers.354 The rationale for
this exception is that extensive regulations are already in place for
these professions; additionally, there are responsibilities inherent in
such fiduciary relationships which make the likelihood of fraud or
deception less likely.355 Therefore, it would not be such a radical
concept to grant the art auction industry an exception in the same
vein. An industry-wide exemption would also simplify the work of
the Commission in crafting an amendment, as well as provide a
bright-line rule for courts to follow.356
Moreover, in the art market, consumer protection is already
addressed through other remedies, such as breach of warranty claims
in contract, or fraud and misrepresentations claims about
authenticity in tort. 357 In addition, several states have enacted
comprehensive legislation specific to the art market to deal with

353

See Cristallina S.A. v. Christie, Manson & Woods Int’l, Inc., 502 N.Y.S.2d 165, 171
(N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (holding that an auctioneer, as an agent to the consignor, has a
fiduciary duty “to act in the utmost good faith” in the interest of the consignor). But see
Brenna Adler, The International Art Auction Industry: Has Competition Tarnished Its
Finish, 23 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 433 (2003) (discussing that the auction industry has not
always adhered to these high standards).
354
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1689.5(d) (Deering 2018).
355
See Williams v. Kapilow & Son, Inc., 164 Cal. Rptr. 176, 180–81 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980)
(holding that the Home Solicitation Sales Act applied to the services of an insurance
adjustment firm and that there was a rational basis for the exemptions for regulated
professions in the statute).
356
“A bright-line rule has the advantage of providing clear guidance . . . . Clarity as to
what the law requires is generally a good thing.” Welch v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 801
N.W.2d 590, 601 (Iowa 2011).
357
See generally, e.g., Pasternack v. Essay Art Galleries, 90 F. Supp. 849 (W.D. Ark.
1950) (inducing a buyer to bid at an auction by fraud or misrepresentation will entitle the
buyer to rescind the contract); Dawson v. G. Malina, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 461 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (plaintiff-buyer of allegedly inauthentic ancient Chinese vases brought action for
breach of warranty); Balog v. Ctr. Art Gallery-Hawaii, 745 F. Supp. 1556 (D. Haw. 1990)
(plaintiff-buyer of allegedly inauthentic Salvator Dali works brought claims of breach of
express warranty and fraudulent concealment); Rogath v. Siebenmann, 129 F.3d 261 (2d
Cir. 1997) (plaintiff-buyer of allegedly inauthentic Francis Bacon painting brought claims
of breach of warranty and fraud against seller); Krahmer v. Christie’s, Inc., 903 A.2d 773
(Del. Ct. Ch. 2006) (plaintiff-buyer of allegedly inauthentic Frank Weston Benson painting
brought claim of fraud and negligent misrepresentation against seller).
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questions of authenticity and art market practices. 358 Intuitively,
these remedies are more appropriate in art transactions than
cooling-off period rules because, not only were they were designed
with market-specific analysis in mind, but also they get to the heart
of the dispute and openly address the true source of the conflict.359
Furthermore, these remedies show that an exclusion for art auctions
would not leave the consumer without protection.
In the alternative, a broad exemption for the sale of art would
follow the logic of behavioral economics scholars who argue that
regulation based on market-specific analysis provides for the
optimal contract. 360 As mentioned above, art exists in its own
“economic microcosm,” such that a cancelled sale “burns” the art
and causes material harm to unique items.361 This market-specific
analysis suggests that, on balance, withdrawal rights do more harm
than good in art transactions.362 Empirical research into whether a
significant number of buyers are exercising the right to withdraw at
art auctions and whether this outstrips otherwise successful sales
may be useful in further evaluating the net harm to the industry.
Further, while a definition for “art” may be difficult to craft,
it is not impossible, as illustrated by existing art market
specific legislation.363
B. Requiring Consumers to Cover the Cost of Cancellation
A more modest proposal for reform would at least reduce the
costs of withdrawal rights and the potential for abuse of these rights.
There are a number of cases which demonstrate that the withdrawal
right is being exploited.364 In auction-related cases, disputes arose
when a consumer claimed to be dissatisfied with the services
received. 365 Thus, rather than cooling-off rules serving their
purpose—to provide a cooling-off period to buyers—it has been
358

See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 686.504-505 (LexisNexis 2018); IOWA CODE §§ 715B1-B4
(2018); N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW §§ 11.01-16.01 (2018).
359
See supra Parts I.A.2; II.C.2.
360
See supra Part I.A.2.
361
See supra Part II.A.
362
See supra Part III.
363
See, e.g., N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW §§ 11.01–16.01.
364
See supra Part II.C.2.
365
See supra Part II.C.2.
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transformed into a satisfaction-guarantee right.366 If the purpose of
the rules are to give consumers protection against high pressure
door-to-door sales by providing them time to cancel these contracts,
then the effect of the rules does not match with this purpose.
An amendment that requires consumers to compensate sellers
for the diminished value of the goods and sunk costs through
depreciation loss or cancellation fees could minimize abuses of the
right to withdraw, such as moral hazard, and still protect the
consumer.367 Even advocates for withdrawal rights have recognized
that the optimal contract includes a balancing of the buyer’s gain
with the seller’s loss.368
Depreciation costs could fully account for the diminished
market value of art subject to cancellation. However, the drawback
of depreciation costs is that they are often difficult to calculate,369
which makes a general exception for art or art auctions an easier
remedy to implement.370 When an artwork fails to sell, the best way
to determine its depreciation in value is through the market’s
response.371 This calculation may not be available until the work is
resold, if it can be resold.372 A solution could be to use the average
depreciation value put forth by studies, i.e., 27–33%.373 Yet, this
average may fluctuate largely, depending on the specific work of art
and the circumstances of the cancelled sale.374 Hence, alternatively,
as Omri Ben-Shahar has suggested, time could be used as a proxy
for depreciation.375

366

See supra Part I.
Rekaiti & Van den Bergh, supra note 1, at 382 (noting that the moral hazard problem
could be deterred by imposing depreciation costs on the consumer).
368
See Ben-Shahar & Posner, supra note 16, at 121; see also Rekaiti & Van den Bergh,
supra note 1, at 394 (“As long as such a penalty imposed on the consumer deciding to
withdraw from the . . . agreement can be justified as a counterpart to the costs incurred by
the [seller] it may be considered . . . efficient.”).
369
See BI Report, supra note 2.
370
See Ben-Shahar & Posner, supra note 16, at 138, 144 (discussing that withdrawal
rights are ill suited to markets where depreciation is difficult to measure).
371
See BI Report, supra note 2.
372
See id.
373
See id; see also Beggs & Graddy, supra note 126, at 18, 20.
374
See Beggs & Graddy, supra note 126, at 22.
375
See Ben-Shahar & Posner, supra note 16, at 122.
367
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Because depreciation costs are difficult to calculate, a set
cancellation fee might be a more practical solution.376 A number of
states already provide for liquidated damages clauses or cancellation
fees for sellers when a buyer exercises the right to withdraw. 377
Unfortunately for sellers, these provisions could currently be
preempted by the federal regulation.378 Therefore, it would make
sense to harmonize the federal regulation with state statutes by
amending the regulation to include a cancellation fee.
Without an explicit amendment for cancellation fees or
depreciation costs, consumers may inevitably bear the cost of “free”
withdrawals. In practice, the costs sellers expect to suffer as a result
of regulation generally translates into higher prices.379 Ultimately,
the buyer will pay more up front as insurance against a poor
purchase.380 Thus, ironically, the buyer is made worse off by the
right to free withdrawal as a result of the seller’s price increase.381
Therefore, not only do free withdrawals create inefficiency in the art
market,382 but in practice they actually undermine the redistributive
objective of the withdrawal policy.383 Clearly, it is in the consumer’s
best interest for the FTC to prescribe a specific percentage cancellation fee or provide for a method to calculate depreciation costs.
C. Excluding Transactions Over a Maximum Purchase Price
Alternatively, amending the Cooling-Off Rule to cap the
maximum purchase price of transactions subject to the right of
withdrawal would be another way to minimize buyer’s opportunism.
A cap would encourage consumers to develop rational purchase
behavior when they are involved in complex and high-value

376

See id.
Andrew Randol, Ohio’s Home Solicitation Sales Act: Consumer Protection
Overreach, 10 OHIO ST. BUS. L.J. 73, 86 (2015) (noting that Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Rhode Island all have statutes that provide for liquidated
damages clauses or cancellation fees for sellers when a buyer exercises the right to
withdraw).
378
See supra Part I.B.
379
See Ben-Shahar & Posner, supra note 16, at 122.
380
Id. at 129.
381
Id.
382
Id. at 122.
383
Id. at 130.
377
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transactions. As the 2008 financial crisis shows, irrational spending
harms not only consumers, but can also devastate economies.384
Generally, the purchase of relatively inexpensive goods is held
to a lesser standard of care and consumers do not give much thought
to the transaction because they often capitulate to impulse buys.385
Yet, art auctions involve carefully curated pieces with a historic past
that are expected to reach record prices.386 Such transactions should
be held to a higher standard of care. Buyers over a certain maximum
threshold would merely be asked to exercise more care and precision
in their purchases for these valuable items.387 Thus, setting a limit
on transactions subject to cancellation would encourage more
efficiency in the market.
Indeed, transactions in the art trade demand due diligence.388
Consumers in this market need to confirm authenticity and assess
price accuracy, in addition to evaluating their personal use value and

384

See Andy Hira, Irrational Exuberance: An Evolutionary Perspective on the
Underlying Causes of the Financial Crisis, 48 INTERECONOMICS 116, 121 (2013).
385
Bar-Gill, supra note 29, at 758.
386
Auction houses sell items in the following categories: fine art, decorative arts (e.g.,
furniture, ceramics), and luxury goods (e.g., jewelry, watches, wine, handbags).
WOODHAM, supra note 11, at 11; see also Nate Freeman, The 20 Most Expensive Artworks
Sold at Auction in 2018, ARTSY (Dec. 24, 2018), https://www.artsy.net/article/artsyeditorial-20-expensive-artworks-sold-2018 (last visited Feb. 17, 2020) (noting that the sale
of Kerry James Marshall’s Past Times (1997) for $21.1 million was not even within the
top 50 most expensive artworks sold in 2018).
387
See Bar-Gill, supra note 29, at 758.
388
Purchasers have a right to inspect goods for sale at auction previews. LEONARD D.
DUBOFF ET AL., THE DESKBOOK OF ART LAW M-70 (2008). In fact, because goods at auction
are sold “as is,” buyers are highly encouraged to do so. Id. Auction house conditions of
sale typically contain a disclaimer, warning purchasers to personally inspect lot items. See,
e.g., Conditions of Online-Only Sale, supra note 5, at 2 (“Prospective buyers acknowledge
this fact and accept responsibility for carrying out inspections and investigations to satisfy
themselves as to the lots in which they may be interested.”). In Christie’s Inc. v. Dominica
Holding Corp., the court noted that buyers have heightened duties of due diligence when
an auctioneer includes a disclaimer to examine property. Christie’s Inc. v. Dominica
Holding Corp., 2006 WL 2012607, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). The Supreme Court of New
York has also found that sophisticated buyers operating in the top price brackets should
conduct due diligence. MAFG Art Fund, LLC v. Gagosian, 123 A.D.3d 458, 459 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2014).
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the intrinsic value of the artwork prior to a purchase. 389 Thus,
capping the price of transactions subject to the right would provide
an incentive for buyers in this market to act according to industry
practice.390 Buyers in the art market already tend to come from a
highly discerning group.391 Art auctions particularly attract a group
of buyers who are knowledgeable about art and experienced
with traditional auction principles. 392 Therefore, it would not be
difficult for consumers to adjust to such an amendment of the
withdrawal right.
Although a boundary may be hard to set for the Commission, it
does not follow that no cap should be added to withdrawal rights.
Research into the optimum cost-benefit function, similar to that used
to set the minimum threshold, would help in determining the ideal
cap. Incidentally, the minimum threshold requirement was primarily
included in the Rule as a result of industry lobbying to protect the
livelihood of route salesmen, such as milkmen, who provided
essential services or products. 393 Thus, the lack of any current
maximum limit could mean a few different things. Perhaps the
Rule’s drafters were in fact concerned about large sales, or they did
not think that door-to-door sales would encompass high value
transactions. Or perhaps they simply failed to consider the need for
an exclusionary cap, which artworld stakeholders could now make
clear to the Commission.
CONCLUSION
The extension of withdrawal rights to the sale of art at auction
would be detrimental not only to the value of the artwork on the
auction block, and the auction house, but most importantly, to the
consumer. This result in the art market can be attributed to the fact
that regulators neglected relevant market-specific insights when
389
See MERRYMAN, supra note 192, at 965. Two different types of due diligence are
usually performed: (1) legal, regarding ownership; and (2) artistic, including authenticity
and provenance. See id.
390
The use of an art advisor or art consultant is a common practice in the art market. See
id. at 970.
391
See SMITH, supra note 11, at 69.
392
See id.
393
FTC Cooling-Off Rule Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 31, at 22945–46.
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drafting the rules, which suggests the need for new approaches
to regulation.
Despite a plausible application of withdrawal rights to art
auctions, the FTC should amend the Cooling-Off Rule to clearly
exclude art auctions. Art auctions differ from other markets where
door-to-door sales are prevalent in terms of the valuation of goods,
the sales practices, as well as the relative sophistication and
bargaining power of contracting parties. The effects of extending
cooling-off rules to this market do not comport with the
intended purpose of these rules to protect against high-pressure
home solicitation sales. An industry-wide exception for art auctions
is the best solution because it not only responds to the intended
purpose of cooling-off rules, but also acknowledges that art is incompatible with the right to cancel. Further, there is a high
likelihood that the FTC would adopt an exclusion for art auctions
because it has already excluded auto auctions using the same
purpose-based argument.
At minimum, the FTC should amend the Rule to discourage
buyer’s opportunism and the use of withdrawal as a satisfaction
guarantee right. Imposing a cancellation fee or a cap will correct
incentives while still protecting consumers by giving them a
cooling-off period. These amendments are both relatively simple to
adopt: all that would be needed is research into the optimal
cost-benefit functions and the political will to accomplish the
objective. However, while these solutions will prevent abuse, they
fall short of addressing the fundamental incompatibility of the right
to cancel with art sales.
Consumer protection law should respond to the particular
behavior of people who enter bargains within the context of their
promises, which includes the art market. Otherwise, consumer
protection law will only end up hurting the people it is supposed to
help. Given the tremendous potential costs of inaction and the ease
of reform efforts, auction houses should not hesitate to make this
reform a reality by petitioning for an industry-wide exception.
Traditionally, the legal system has misunderstood specialized
areas of the law like art. In this respect, Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes has acknowledged the lack of expertise of the judge and
jury, and the limitations of litigation in achieving the objectives of
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an art dispute. 394 To solve this problem a team of creative New
York-based art lawyers developed a new forum dedicated
exclusively to resolving art-related disputes, the Court of Arbitration
for Art.395 As this example illustrates, it is upon stakeholders in the
artworld to proactively develop new approaches to regulation of the
right to withdraw as it relates to art transactions.

394

See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (“It would
be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves
final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most
obvious limits.”).
395
See About Us, COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR ART, https://www.cafa.world/cafa/
[https://perma.cc/Z7DB-CZP7].
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